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1Abstract
This study investigates the emergence of accountability in a natural
resource-rich regency in Indonesia namely Bojonegoro. While it is
widely acknowledged that natural resource-abundance tends to be
associated with predatory states, Bojonegoro has promoted
accountability and achieved a high level of economic growth in the
last five years. This study employs theory of New Political Economy
Perspective (NPEP) which focuses on the incentives of politicians to
promote policies of good governance. This paper thus attempts to
analyze the incentives that inﬂuence the local elites' decision to
promote accountability in Bojonegoro. The study finds that electoral
system and collective actions in Bojonegoro, rule of law at the
national level and political promotion within the political party drive
politicians to promote accountability in Bojonegoro. To my
knowledge, this is the first study that discusses the emergence of
accountability in resource-rich areas at the sub-national level.
Therefore, this thesis advances the knowledge of resource curse
theoretically and empirically.
Key words: Accountability, Indonesia, Local Politics, Natural
resources, Political economy,
Words: 19,939
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1. 1. Background
It is widely acknowledged that natural resource-abundance tends to be associated
with predatory activities of the states and lower economic growth. This argument
is known as resources curse hypothesis. A puzzling piece of empirical evidence
has been able to confirm this hypothesis. A seminal work by Sachs and Warner
(1995) was among the first paper to introduce and confirm resources curse. Using
data from the period 1971-1989, they reveal that economies with a high ratio of
natural resource export to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) tend to have low
growth during the subsequent period, keeping other variables found to be
important for economic growth constant such as initial per capita income, trade
policy, government efficiency, and investment rate. Similarly, using broader
indicator of development such as Human Development Index (HDI), life
expectancy, water supply, and level undernourished population, Bulte and
Damania (2005) find that resource-intensive countries tend to suﬀer from lower
levels of human development. At the country level, Komarulzaman and
Alisjahbana (2005) show that resource-rich regions in Indonesia dominated the
regions with high level of poverty rate. Nevertheless, this hypothesis does not
apply to one regency in Indonesia: Bojonegoro. Instead of being a predatory state,
this regency has been able to achieve a high-level of economic growth over the
last eight years (annual Gross Regional Domestic Product growth was 9.96%) and
its annual Gross Regional Domestic product (GRDP) growth is higher than the
national GDP growth.
Several scholars have already tried to find out why this exceptional case
exists. Mehlum et al (2006) argue that the main reason for these diverging
8experiences is differences in the quality of institutions. Since the 1990s, the role
of institutions in economic development has re-gained momentum, including in
the topic of resource curse. The variance of growth performance among resource
rich countries is due to how resource rents are distributed through the institutional
arrangement (Ibid). A study from Robinson et al (2006) shows that regions with
accountability will tend to benefit from resource booms. Therefore, accountability
is a key to explain diverging experiences in resource-abundant regions. In the case
of Bojonegoro, accountability exists, which can explain why Bojonegoro is the
exceptional case in Indonesia. A government can be argued promoting
accountability if the government's performance of tasks or functions are subject to
another’s oversight, direction or request that they provide information or
justification for their actions (Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 2009).
1. 2. Research Problem and Question
As mentioned before, accountability in Bojonegoro is pointed as the important
factor that enable resources to become a blessing. However, accountability have
not existed until 2008. Before 2008, the local government in Bojonegoro was
considered as one of the worst regencies in Indonesia. In 2011, McCulloch
analyzed economic characteristics and performance of Indonesia's districts
between the years 2001 and 2007. His study shows that several governance
indexes of Bojonegoro were among the worst in Indonesia (McCulloch, 2011). In
addition, H.M Santoso who was regent of Bojonegoro from the period 2003-2008,
was sentenced to 10 years in prison, for two corruption cases (Tribunnews, 2014).
Taking this into account, it is important to investigate why accountability emerges
in Bojonegoro after 2008.
The situation in Bojonegoro is contrast when it is compared to existing
literatures. Several studies explain that natural resource-abundant countries tend to
deteriorate transparency and accountability even deeper so the elites are able to
engage in rent-seeking activities (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Thus there are some
9deficiencies on this topic that makes this problem needs to be addressed. This
thesis seeks to remedy this problem by investigating why accountability came
about in Bojonegoro. Consequently, this research seeks to address the main
research question: "Why did accountability emerge in Bojonegoro after
2008?" While there are several studies that focus on good governance in
resource-rich countries such as Norway, Canada, and Australia (See Frankel,
2010; Humpreys, 2007; Larsen, 2006; Mehlum et al, 2006; Robinson et al, 2006;
Ross, 1999), to my knowledge, this is the first study that discusses the emergence
of accountability in resource-rich areas at the sub-national level. Therefore, this
thesis provides an important opportunity to advance the understanding of the
resource curse.
1. 3. Literature Review
1. 3. 1. Debates on Natural Resources and Development
The relations between natural resources and development have been one major
topic discussed since the beginning of modern economy. The traditional thinking
about this topic is that resource abundance is a key engine for economic
development of a country. According to Ginsburg (Higgins, 1968, p 222), the size
and diversity of natural resource is a key for any country to achieve a high level
economic growth. Several studies also support this argument, such as Viner
(1952) and Lewis (1955). Stevens and Dietsche (2008, p 56) identify there are two
basic mechanisms of traditional arguments concerning the relationship between
natural resource abundance and development. The first mechanism states that
countries with high natural resource endowments have opportunities to invest in
projects and programmes that stimulate economic development from large
revenue inflows following natural resource exports. The second mechanism states
that revenue from natural resources exports will increase imported capital goods,
which is important to promote development. Foreign exchange acquired from
10
national export is important for the imported capital goods. Similarly, several
economists also emphasize the importance of natural resource for economic
development due to its role in stimulating a country's industrial development
(Drake, 1972; Krueger, 1980).
However, during the period 1990s several scholars started to counter this
traditional wisdom. A seminal work by Sachs and Warner (1995) was among the
first paper to challenge the tradition perspective. Using data of the period 1971-
1989, they reveal that economies with a high ratio of natural resource export to
GDP tend to have low growth during the subsequent period. They estimate that a
13% increase in primary exports to GDP leads to lower annual growth by 1%.
Following the study from Sachs and Warner, a number of scholars have
conducted studies supporting the theory that the more natural resources there are
in a country, the higher the possibility of the country to experience
underdevelopment (see: Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Auty, 2001; and Neumayer,
2004).
Moreover, several scholars have tried to investigate the impact of natural
resource on other development indicators other than economic growth since they
consider economic growth is not good enough to proxy the problem of
development in developing countries. Using broader indicator of development
including Human Development Index (HDI), life expectancy, water supply, and
level undernourished population, Bulte and Damania (2005) find that resource-
intensive countries tend to suffer from lower levels of human development.
While the traditional wisdom believes that large revenue inflows following
natural resources exports is a blessing for economic development, the new
conventional argues that a large export of natural resource is a curse for countries.
This argument is related to the economic term: 'Dutch Disease'. It refers to an
economic phenomena in which countries lose their competitiveness in the
manufacturing and trade sector due to an overvalued real exchange rate compared
to other countries. Large export volumes of natural resources leads to an
appreciation of a country’s currency that causes tradable products to become more
expensive compared to other countries' products on the global market.
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Consequently, the domestic manufacturing sector will experience a decline in
competitiveness and  productivity (Neumayer, 2004, p 1628). This problem will
harm the domestic economy in the long-run since the manufacturing sector is
regarded as the main engine of growth (Bulte et al, 2005, p 1030). In addition,
Neumayer (2004, p 1628) also argues that crowded out entrepreneurship activities
and policy makers, who are more interested in resource transfers than developing
and modernizing the country's economy, are several factors that could lead to the
resource curse.
Meanwhile, several scholars argue that the resource curse is attributed to
political aspects. They believe that the economic aspects are not the only
explanation of resource curse. Rossel (2006 p 14-17) has examined that there are
five views of relations between political aspects and the resource curse. The first
perspective is the behaviouralist perspective which suggests that natural resource
abundance leads to various types of emotional or irrational behaviour on the part
of political elites, in turn contributing to poor economic policy-making and
institutional deterioration (Ibid). As quoted by Rossel (2006) from Mitra (1994),
resource booms produce over-optimism in countries. Consequently, the booms
lead to excessive government spending. The second perspective is the rational
actor perspective. It argues that resource abundance provides political elites with
an opportunity to engage in rent-seeking activities. Ascher (1999) suggests that
political elites in resource-abundant countries have wasted their natural resources
for various political objectives such as patronage spending. The third perspective
is the state-centered, which focus on the ability of state to promote economic
development. The policy mismanagement is seen as a major factor in this
perspective (Rossel, 2006, p 16). The fourth perspective is the historico-
structuralist perspective, which argues that resource curse happens due to the
relative power of different social groups or classes. The last perspective is the
social capital perspective. This perspective suggests that natural resource-rich
countries undermine social cohesion. Several scholars are in this perspective such
as Isham et al. (2002), Rodrik 1999 and Hausman 2003 (Rossel, 2006, p 17).
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According to Kolstad & Søreide (2009, p 215) corruption is the main reason
why resource-rich countries perform badly in economic terms. There are two
forms of corruption in resource-rich countries: rent-seeking and patronage. The
former refers the rent-seeking as individuals compete for a share of the rents. The
later can be defined as the use of public resources to secure political power by
providing government positions to political supporters (Kolstad & Søreide 2009, p
217). Robinson et al (2006, p 449) argue that both the rent-seeking and patronage
activities imply the effort of politicians to gain political advantage and to stay in
power. One example is politicians who distribute public jobs in exchange for
electoral support since they believe that this activity influences voting behaviour
(Robinson et al, 2006, p 449). In addition, Robinson et al (2006) argue that a
resource boom increases the incentive for politicians to engage in rent-seek
activities. This incentive leads to lower amount of productive activities in the
economy (Ibid, p 451).
There are two reaons why these rent-seeking activities and patronage
spending lead to lower economic growth. The first reason is because individual
and groups compete for a share of the resource rents so it will reduce their time
and skills for productive activity. Secondly, patronage spending causes a low level
of accountability and a worse allocation of public funds. Public funds that use on
patronage should alternatively be spent in more socially productive ways
(Robinsion, 2006, p 451). This will hamper economic growth since public
resources are spent as a tool of patronage to bolster political support instead of
pro-growth spending such as infrastructure, technology acquisition and human
capital development (Williams et al, 2009, p 17).
However, the specific type of the resource also have an effect on the level of
rent-seeking activities. Auty (2001) argues that countries which have the so-called
‘‘point resources’’ like oil ﬁelds, tend to be captured by political elites who seek
for narrow sectional interests. They are expected to suﬀer from the rentier eﬀects,
repression effects, or policies that hamper the transition of the countries to
industrialized countries (Bulte et al, 2005, p 1031). Petermann et al (2007) and
Leite and Weidmann (1999) also argue that fuel-dependent countries are likely to
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have a higher level of corruption than natural resource-rich countries that depend
on ores, metals or agriculture.
1. 3. 2. Natural Resources and Development: Institutions Matter
If natural resources tend to increase the possibility of the countries to experience
underdevelopment as observed in some countries, then how come developed
countries such as Canada, Australia, and Norway are rich in natural resources?
This is a fundamental question asked by Mehlum et al (2006). They argue that the
main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of
institutions. Since the 1990s, the role of institutions in economic development has
re-gained momentum including in the topic of resource curse. The divergent
experience in growth performance among resource-rich countries is due to how
resource rents are distributed through the institutional arrangement (Ibid). Un and
So (2010, p 124) argue that existing weak social and political institutions allow
the elite to exploit the country’s natural resources for political gain.
Mehlum et al (2006, p 3) classify there are two type of institutions in
resource-rich countries namely producer friendly institutions and grabber friendly
institutions. The former refers to situation where rent-seeking and production are
complementary activities. Producer-friendly institutions attract entrepreneurs into
production, implying higher growth. Meanwhile the later is a condition where
rent-seeking and production are competing activities. In this situation, there are
several indicators that exist such as corruption, weak rule of law, lack of
transparency. This situation can be bad for growth since it attracts scarce
entrepreneurial resources out of production and into unproductive activities (Ibid).
In order to show the empirical evidence, they construct an institutional quality
index based on data from Political Risk Services and suggest that resources have a
positive effect on growth when institutions are good and vice versa (Mehlum et al,
2006).
In addition, there are several papers showing that poor institutions in
resource rich countries lead to a slow economic growth. Lane and Tornell (1999)
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show that lack of strong legal–political institutional infrastructure explains the
disappointing economic performance after the oil windfalls in Nigeria, Venezuela,
and Mexico. Similarly, a study from Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) try to
investigate the link between the level of natural resource and type of political
regime. They suggest a robust and negative correlation between the presence of a
sizable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa.
According to Mehlum et al (2006, p 3), natural resources put the
institutional arrangements to a test, so that only countries with inferior institutions
that are those that suffer from the resource curse. They claim that their hypothesis
is consistent with observations from Botswana and Norway who both have
remarkable performance in good institutions. Well functioning institutions
enabled Botswana to experience the world’s highest growth rate since 1965 and
changed Norway from one of Europe’s poorest countries in 1900 to one of the
richest countries in Europe today (Ibid).
Meanwhile, Sachs and Warner (1995) do not consider institutions as a
variable that determines the outcome. Instead, they argue that natural resources
harm institutional quality which in turn lowers economic growth. They do not see
institutions as a mediating factor but as the object that could be hampered by
natural resources. Various studies also confirm Sachs and Warner's arguments.
For example, Ades and Di Tella (1999) reveal that rents from natural resources
may stimulate corruption among bureaucrats and politicians. Similarly, Acemoglu
et al. (2004) argue that higher resource rents makes it easier for dictators to buy
off political challengers. Resource abundance increases the political beneﬁts of
buying votes through inefficient redistribution. Ross (2001) shows that resource
rents tend to undermine important political features such as checks and balances.
Collier and Hoefﬂer (2009) find a similar result. By using a global panel dataset,
they reveal that the combination of a high natural resource rent and an open
democratic system has been growth-reducing since checks and balances are
eroded by resource rents. In addition, Stevens and Dietsche (2008) also argue that
government in resource-rich countries undertake unproductive redistributive
spending to satisfy political constituencies and they can employ internal security
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to control domestic opponents. Consequently, it undermines the social and
cultural changes that have facilitated democratic transitions and consolidations.
(Stevens & Dietsche, p57, 2008).
In sum, based on the literatures that have been discussed before, it can be
argued that institutions matter in mediating the effect of natural resources on
economic development. A high quality of institutions that promote accountability
will constrain politicians to engage in these activities. Assuming that politicians
are rational actors, well-functioning institutions will make such political
calculation to engage in these activities become infeasible. Conversely, poor
quality institutions will enable politician to engage in activities that undermines
economic development such as corruption, patronage spending, and rent-seeking
activities. Where corruption is widespread, e.g. at the start of oil extraction, the
rent-seeking effect of resource revenues can be more negative (Baland and
Francois, 2000). Moreover, not only do these activities hamper economic
development but they also deteriorate institutions even deeper. In order to engage
in rent-seeking and patronage activities, political elites will hamper institutions
and actively try to prevent better accountability.
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Figure 1.1. Literature Review
Natural
Resources
Blessing for economic development
(Higgins, 1968; Viner, 1952; and Lewis, 1955; Drake,
1972; Krueger, 1980)
Curse if bad institutions exists and vice versa
(Mehlum et al, 2006, Lane and Tornell, 1999; Jensen and
Wantchekon, 2004; Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2009; Baland and
Francois, 200; )
Curse
Economic Indicators (Growth, HDI, etc)
(Sachs and Warner 1995; Leite and Weidmann,
1999; Auty, 2001; and Neumayer, 2004; Gylfason,
2001; Bulte and Damania, 2005)
Political Indicators (Rent-seeking, corruption,
patranoge, deteriorating institutions of
accountability)
(Ascher, 1999; Rossel, 2006; Ades and Di Tella,
1999; Acemoglu et al, 2004; Ross, 2001)
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1. 4. Outline of the Study
After this chapter, a New Political Economy Perspective (NPEP) that is employed
as the main theoretical framework will be discussed in the chapter 2. Then,
methodology that is employed in this thesis is described in the chapter 3. Chapter
4 is devoted to discuss the current governance system in Indonesia and how the
current systems enable local governments to have more authority to govern their
own regions. The current governance system in Indonesia is presented in order to
show the relevance and urgency of a sub-national level study. In chapter 5, story
of Bojonegoro is presented in which it focuses on economic and governance
situations in Bojonegoro before and after oil discovery. Section on governance
situation explains the practice of accountability in Bojonegoro. Then in chapter 6
and 7, I discuss the dynamics at the local and national level that shape local
politicians in Bojonegoro to promote accountability, respectively. This thesis is
concluded by chapter 8 which consists of final reflection and the executive
summary.
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2 Theoretical Framework
It is important to establish theoretical framework in order to answer the question
of why accountability emerges in Bojonegoro. Although this thesis is a case-
centric study, developing theoretical framework is still important to guide data
collection. In addition, the framework, which serves as an existing mechanism, is
tested to see if it can account for the outcome. In this case, I use theoretical
framework from New Political Economy Perspective (NPEP). The more detail
about this framework and the reason why it is chosen will be elaborated in the
following section. In addition to the NPEP, theoretical framework for this study is
developed by incorporating several political-economy theories that fall within
NPEP. I will elaborate these theories in the second section. The third section is
devoted to describe final model analysis and operational framework for this study.
2. 1. New Political Economy Perspective (NPEP)
Selecting the most suited theories for the thesis could, to some extent, be
problematic since there are a lot of factors that might contribute to the emergence
of accountability. However, in this thesis, I select a New Political Economy
Perspective (NPEP) as the main theoretical framework. NPEP argues that the
explanation of why some governments practice good governance such as
accountability and transparency is attributed to the incentives and interests faced
by politicians (Landell-Mill et al, 2007; p 2). Consequently, political elites are the
main actors in this perspective whereby their decision to promote accountability
are largely driven by incentives and interests.
NPEP was firstly coined by Pierre Landell-Mills  et al in 2007. This
perspectives tries to answer the problem of underdevelopment in developing
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countries that cannot be answered by other perspectives such as institutional
economics. Institutional economics argue that the promotion of good institutions
is a key to enable a country to achieve a high level of development. This
perspective has been a major perspective in the last 20 years. One seminal work
from Rodrik et al (2004) suggests that institutions matter more than other factors
such as geography and international trade in explaining per capita income growth.
The importance of institutions in economic growth was also revealed by the
World Bank when they studied factors that drive economic growth in the world
during the 1990s. They suggest that "good institutions" matter more for growth
than "good policies" (World Bank, 2005). Hence, it is not surprising that the shift
can be observed in the World Bank's policy. While during the period 1980s, the
World Bank focus on promoting good market-friendly policies in developing
countries, in the beginning of millennium, the World Bank focused on promoting
'good governance', which is considered as one crucial factor in stimulating
economic growth (Lauridsen, 2012).
Nevertheless, Landell-Mills et al (2007) argue that although institutions are
important in development, it does not answer the question of how institutions
come about in different contexts. They explain that this discrepancy cause a
problem when introducing the new institutions in certain regions since these new
institutions threaten the interests of governing elites and other powerful interest
groups. Therefore, the New Political Economy Perspective (NPEP) is intended to
fill this remedy by arguing that incentives should be the main focus when
promoting institutions. This perspective is based on the notion that the decision to
promote accountability lies on politicians' hands. So it is important to put
emphasize on incentives faced by politicians that drive them to introduce
accountability.
Pierre Landell-Mills et al (2007) describe that NPEP is a more multi-
disciplinary and seeks to combine the insights of political economy with  the ‘new
institutional economics’ and the study of social processes, cultural norms and
ethnicity. Consequently, by combining these two perspectives, NPEP focuses on
the incentives that shape the decisions of governing elites to promote institutions
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favourable to development. In addition, since this perspective is combined with
new institutional economics so they argue that incentives are influence by both
formal and informal institutions. All of them are shaped and perpetuated by
historical, cultural and ethnic inﬂuences.
Incentives faced by politicians have been acknowledged as an important
aspect in political-economies theories. Although there have been bulk of
researches that suggest that institutions of democracy is superior when it comes to
promoting economic growth, democracy is not always a panacea for economic
growth since even in democratic countries, politicians still have incentives to
divert resources to political rents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at
the expense of many (Keefer and Khemani, 2005). A number studies have found
that incentives matter for economic development (Besley and Persson 2007; Jones
and Olken 2005). In connection to the resource curse, Robinson et al (2006) also
argue that the incentives to promote accountability are the key to enable natural
resources to be a blessing.
Using NPEP in this thesis implies that political elites are the main actors and
their decision to promote accountability are largely driven by incentives and
interests. However, it is important to address the question of what are the
incentives faced by politicians and how these incentives drive politicians to
promote accountability. Therefore, the next section is devoted to elaborate
theories that connect incentives faced by politicians with accountability.
2. 2. A Two-Level Framework
As mentioned before, this section discuss theories that connect incentives faced by
politicians with accountability. However, it is worth to mention that I divide the
theories and analysis into two level of analysis (a two-level of framework) namely
the national level and the local level. There are two reasons why I choose to
divide the theories and analysis into two level. The first reason is because the unit
of analysis in this thesis is a sub-national level. A study on sub-national level
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requires me to investigate the local context and institutions that shape local
politicians to promote accountability. However, it is also high of importance to
investigate dynamics at the national level since the dynamics at the national level
will affect the local level. Secondly, since this study uses the process tracing
methods so it requires me to be sensitive to the possibility of equifinality (George
Barnett, 2005 p 215). The following sub sections will elaborate theories within
each level of analysis.
2. 2. 1. Local Level Analysis
The local level examines the ways in which local institutions and contexts create
incentives for individual actions. In this case, I identify there are two theories that
can be used to explain institutions and context at the local level that create
incentives for local politicians to promote accountability, namely electoral
theories of democracy and participatory theories. Both theories are related to a
theory developed by Albert O. Hirschman called Exit, Voice, and Loyality (1970).
The basic idea of his theory is that when the costumers face the lack of quality of
goods, the costumers have options either exit or to voice (Hircsman, 1974). It has
been applied in numerous cases including in political science field where the
politicians or public officials are considered as producers and the citizen act as
costumers. When the consumers (citizens) perceive poor performances of the
producers (the government), they have options to voice (lobby, social campaign,
mass demonstration) or exit (they do not elect the incumbent in the elections).
The electoral theory of democracy suggests that elected governments are
responsive and accountable to public demands since citizens are able to sanction
bad politicians and give incentive good ones. Sanction refers to threat from
citizens to remove them for poor performance and the reward means electing
representatives who are competent, honest, and who share public's preferences
(Cleary, 2007; p 285). Seabright (1996) argues that accountability of local
officials is also related to the electoral mechanism to elect local larders -whether
they are elected by local election or central authority. His study reveals that
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elected local officials may be valuable in improving accountability of
governments to their citizens compared to elected central officials. Hence, it is
important to analyze the electoral system in Bojonegoro to understand how
political institutions at the local level create incentives for local government to
promote accountability.
The second theory is participatory theories or collective action which refer
to the ability of local actors to organize themselves to call for accountability from
their governments. Cleary (2007, p 284) argues that responsiveness of politicians
may depend on a citizen’s ability to articulate demands and pressure government
through a wide range of political action beyond voting such as protest, public
speech, lobbying, or direct contact with government officials. This theory is much
related to collective action theory which was introduced by Mancur Olson (1965).
One important relation between collective action and local politicians is in
countries where citizens have ability to act collectively, local politicians have
greater incentives to pursue public policies in the public interest (Keefer, 2011).
Therefore, the politicians have greater incentives to promote accountability when
the citizens have ability to organise themselves to lobby the politicians.
According to Williams et al (2009), there are four factors that shape the
strength of collective action: the urgency and importance of the issue at stake,
their internal divisions and conflicts of interest, their lobbying capacity and the
likelihood that their actions will have an influence on government. Moreover,
Williams et al (2009) explain that there are several types of organised group that
commonly seek to apply pressure on political leadership namely business
organization, civil-society organisation and media, organised labour, consumer
groups, and independent research centres.
Nevertheless collective action does not necessarily mean positive for
development since there is a case in which collective action could lead to
extractive rent-seeking by small elite groups (Williams et al, 2009). From the
original idea introduced by Olson, collective action would pose problem of free-
rider in which the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their
personal welfare so they will not act to advance their common group objectives
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unless there is coercion to force them to do so. Consequently, each member of the
group prefers that another member pay the entire cost (Dasgupta and Beard,
2007).
2. 2. 2. National Level Analysis
The second level is national level analysis. According to Whiting (2006, p 265),
analysis at the national level is still important for studies that use local level as the
unit of analysis since policies and actions at the national level shape local
politicians incentives through administrative hierarchy. She emphasizes the
urgency to include investigation at the national level based on her study. Her
study suggests that the incentives for local politicians to promote industrialization
and property rights in China after Mao era are also driven by political dynamics at
the national level. In addition, she states that political dynamics at the national
level is exogenous factors for incentives and constraints at the local level.
Although decentralization has relocated power from central government to
local government, it is believed that any change at the national level still affect the
local level. According to Hadiz (2003 p 600), local political dynamics mirror
those at the national level. In addition, Gibson (2010, p 4) emphasizes that local
politics will be affected by political dynamic at national levels. Leaders at local
level will be constrained in how visibly they can exercise their actions. Hence, it
drives local level to create new policies or institutions that are compatible with
national dynamics (Ibid). It is in line with argument from Aspinall (2010, p 27)
that national politics came to determine local political dynamics. Therefore, in
order to understand why accountability come about in Bojonegoro, it is also
important to investigate political dynamics at national level. Since the dynamics at
national level may shape local politicians' incentives and constraints. In this case,
I identified there are two theories namely institution of rule of law and political
promotion.
Rule of Law is the first variable within national level. Over the years, rule of
law is widely acknowledged as one important institution that shape incentives and
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constraint for the politicians. According to Groenewegen et al (2010), the rule of
law is one crucial requirements for all institutions since it is the one that makes
institutions credible. O'Donnell argues that only under a rule of law, the various
agencies of electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability will work effectively
(2004, p 32). The rule of law falls within the national level since the responsibility
to enforce the law still in the hand of national government.
The second factor within national level is political promotion. The
promotion system is argued by Knight (2012) as an important aspect in promoting
accountability. According to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) the political
incentives are shaped by the promotion system and applied by political parties. If
the party has a system to promote the local politicians to national government, it
will increase the incentives for the politicians to promote accountability at the
local level (Ibid). In addition, it can also be used as a mechanism to punish local
politicians that fail to perform at the local level. National political parties will
emphasize the performance of local politicians because national governing parties
are evaluated by voters according to overall national performance. One example
of how political promotion affects incentives can be seen from the case of China
which exercise the cadre evaluation system. This system is argued to have
massive impact in shaping local official behaviour by linking both the
remuneration and advancement of local leaders to performance of politicians
(Whiting, p 72, 2006). The cadre evaluation system allowed county officials to
compare the performance on the full range of indicators of township leaders
across locales. Cadre's performances were recorded in officials' personnel ﬁles
and therefore helped identify the most competent cadres for promotion (Ibid, p
104).
2. 3. Model of Analysis and Operational Framework
After elaborating theories on the previous section, a model of analysis can be
formulated as Figure 2.1. In order to understand why accountability comes about,
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two level analysis will be conducted. The first level is local level and it examines
the ways in which local institutions create incentives for and constraints on
individual actions. Based on electoral and participatory theories discussed before,
there are two aspects that will be explain namely electoral system in Bojonegoro
and citizens' ability to articulate demands and pressure government. The second
level is national level whereby investigation of political dynamics at national level
is conducted. It focuses on rule of law and political promotion at the national
level. This analysis is important since the dynamics at national level may shape
local politicians' incentives and constraints, which contribute to the emergence of
accountability in Bojonegoro.
Figure 2.1Model of Analysis
Based on the framework and theories discussed before, the operational framework
can be summarized by Table 2.1 below.
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Table 2.1. Operational Framework
Variable Operationalisation
Dependent The regent of Bojonegoro promote
accountability in Bojonegoro
Independent National
Level
Rule of Law Politicians will have greater incentives to
promote accountability if there is rule of
law. In addition, rule of law also
constraints the politicians to engage in
rent-seeking and patronage activities
Political
Incentives
Politicians will have more incentives to
promote accountability if there is decent
political promotion system
Local
Level
Electoral
Theories of
Democracy
When the local leaders are elected
through the election, they will be more
responsive and more accountable.
Participation
Theories
When citizen have ability to act
collectively, governments have greater
incentives to promote accountability
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3 Methodology
3. 1. A Single Case Study
This study analyzes why accountability emerges in Bojonegoro after the oil
discovery. Considering the fact that only one case used in this study, so it can be
argued that this a case study. Campbell (2010) explains that case studies can have
either a quantitative focus or qualitative focus. Since this thesis aims to
understand the case in depth, and in its natural setting while recognizing its
complexity and its context, hence this thesis has a qualitative focus.
Resource curse has been discussed widely and most studies have employed
quantitative methods whereby regression analysis using panel data or cross-
sectional data were conducted. Kraska (2010) explains that this method is useful
for establishing predictive validity, establishing reliability, and describing
relationship. Nevertheless, as admitted by Stevens and Dietsche (2008, p 64),
quantitative methods fail to capture changes in interests over time. In addition,
they argue that further research should put greater efforts to explore the real
conﬂicts of interests between domestic social groups in resource-rich countries.
Therefore, this thesis offers an additional and richer insight on the topic of
resource curse. This argument is also supported by George and Bennett (2005)
who emphasize that one merit of case studies is the ability to examine the
operation of causal mechanism in individual cases in details.
Beside the ability to explore the causal mechanism, they argue that there are
two additional advantages of case studies. The first advantage is a high level of
conceptual validity. Many social scientist are interested in case studies since they
have ability to achieve a high level of conceptual validity. This is due to the fact
that several variables used in the social sciences are difficult to measure. Another
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advantage of case studies are heuristic identification of new variables during the
study (George and Bannett, 2005).
These three advantages are well suited to this thesis. Firstly, its ability to
explore the causal mechanism will allow me to find out a complex system that
leads the emergence of accountability in Bojonegoro. Secondly, as discussed
before, this approach will allow me to achieve high levels of conceptual validity.
Lastly, although I have established theoretical framework to guide the analysis of
relationship between these two variables, there is always a possibility that I find a
new important variable during the study.
Nonetheless, there are several limitations of a case study design. The first
limitation is the case study can make only tentative conclusions on how much
particular variable contribute to the outcome in a particular case (George and
Bannet, 2005). This limitation has been the source of debate on quantitative and
qualitative approach and it can be seen as a trade-off when choosing quantitative
or qualitative methods (George and McKeown, 1985). Nevertheless, as stressed
by George and Bannet (2005), a case study design is still applicable when
conducting research that focuses on finding the conditions under which specified
outcomes occurs. Thus, I consider a case study still appropriate since I only focus
on finding causal mechanism that lead to the emergence of accountability in
Bojonegoro. The second limitation with case studies is the problem internal
validity so I will not make any generalization to other cases based on this study.
The third limitation is case selection bias. I will address this problem further in the
"Case Selection" section.
Initially, a comparative case study was expected to be done in order to
compare the practice of accountability in two resource-abundant regions.
However, due to the difficulty to control variable and considering the fact that
Bojonegoro is a special case so a single case study is preferred. In addition,
according to Blatter and Haverland (2012, p 84), the decision to employ case
study research is likely stimulated by rare events and desire to know how a
speciﬁc social or political community (for example, a country or region) is able to
be successful in a certain respect. Moreover, George and Barnett (2005, p 214)
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argue that process-tracing, which will be discussed in more details in the next
section, offers an alternative way for making causal inferences if it is impossible
to find a controlled comparison. They argue that one or more of the several
independent variables identified may have causal impact when it is not possible to
find cases similar in every respect but one- (the basic requirement of controlled
comparisons). Process tracing can help to assess whether each of the potential
causal variables in the imperfectly matched cases can, or cannot, be ruled out as
having causal significance (Ibid).
3. 2. Process-Tracing Methods
There are several alternative methods within case studies. One promising method
is process-tracing method (Pedersen, 2013 p 2), which refers to a data analysis
method for identifying, validating, and testing causal mechanisms in a
theoretically informed way (Reilly, 2010). Blatter and Haverland (2012, p 80)
explain that the process-tracing focuses on Y, which means that the researcher is
interested multiple interaction or causal mechanism causes of a speciﬁc outcome
(Y). I identify that process-tracing is the most suited approach for this thesis
because the research question of this thesis focuses on Y (dependent variable).
George and Barnett (2005, p 210) argue that process-tracing is an useful tool as a
supplement in large-N statistical analyses, which are settling for a statement of a
probabilistic finding regarding only one causal path at work and likely to overlook
the possibility of equifinality. This is the advantage of using this approach due to
its ability to discover whether the phenomenon being investigated is characterized
by equifinality or multiple convergence.
The causal mechanism is the important feature of this method (Pedersen p
2), thus it is important to define causal mechanism. Glenan argues (1996, p 52 in
Pedersen, 2013, p 1) that a causal mechanism is a complex system which
produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts. So the process-
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tracing method offers a mechanism to go beyond only identifying correlations
between independent variables (Xs) and dependent variables (Ys).
According to Pedersen (2013, p 3) there are three variants of process tracing
methods: theory testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome. Theory testing
process-tracing refers to methods to test whether that each part of a hypothesized
causal mechanism, which is developed from existing theories, is present in a given
case. Meanwhile, theory building process-tracing is a method that attempts to
build a theoretical explanation from empirical evidence and that theory can be
used for other cases. On the contrary, explaining-outcome process-tracing seeks to
make a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific case.
The aim of explaining-outcome process-tracing is not to build or test more general
theories but to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case.
Hence, the focus of this variant is more case centric than theory-oriented (Ibid). In
this case, I identify that explaining-outcome process-tracing is the most suited
variant of process-tracing methods for this thesis because the aim of this thesis is
to explain a particular interesting and puzzling outcome: accountability in a
resource-rich region. Hence, it is a case centric rather than theory-oriented.
There is a big difference between theory-centric and case-centric when it
comes to the causal mechanism. According to Pedersen (2013, p 35) in the theory-
centric variant, mechanisms are understood as mid-range theories of mechanisms
that transmit causal forces from X to Y and are expected to be present in a
population of cases, assuming that the context that allows them to operate is
present. Conversely, in the case-centric study, a causal mechanism is developed
by combining several mechanisms into an eclectic conglomerate mechanism to
account for a particular outcome. Since the aim of case-centric studies is to craft a
minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome so it is necessary to
include non-systematic parts in the causal mechanism. In connection to this, case-
centric studies use iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex
conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced
the outcome in question (Ibid).
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Explaining-outcome process-tracing can be done trough deductive or
inductive manner (Pedersen, 2013; p 19). However, in thesis I use deductive path
in which an existing mechanism is tested to see whether it explains the outcome.
Therefore, the theoretical framework, which has been developed in the previous
section, serves as the existing mechanism. Then this mechanism is tested to find
out whether this mechanism can explain the outcome. However, it is likely that
the existing mechanism will not be categorical for the final explanation since this
method requires an iterative process where the model will be updated until it
provides what can be thought of as the best possible explanation (Day and
Kincaid 1994 in Pedersen, p 20). The process will be stopped when it has a
minimally sufficient explanation. The decision to stop is based on an assessment
of whether all of the relevant aspects of the outcome have been accounted while
ensuring that the evidence is best explained by the developed explanation instead
of plausible alternative explanations (Ibid, p 20-21).
3. 3. Case Selection
Case selection can be very problematic in case studies but George and
Bennett (2005 p 83) emphasize that the primary criterion for case selection should
be relevance to the research objective. Since this study is a case-centric so it will
focus in a particular interesting case. Consequently, the case that is selected for
this study should reflect an interesting outcomes both substantively and
theoretically (Pedersen, 2013; p 169). In this context, process-tracing approach
offers advantage considering the fact that I investigate the deviant case of the
existing theories on resource curse. George and Barnett (2005, p 215) emphasized
that this approach is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for deviant
case, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by existing
theories. This situation is often encountered In large-N studies and usually without
an effort to explain why they are deviant. Therefore, process-tracing offers an
opportunity to contribute to the development of a rich, differentiated theory about
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deviant cases (ibid). Consequently, this section will be devoted to explain why
Bojonegoro is an exceptional case.
I pick Bojonegoro as the case because it represents an exceptional case from
current views of natural resources. Several existing theories argue that resource-
rich regions tend to be associated with lower economic growth and lack of
accountability. Nevertheless, this association does not apply with Bojonegoro.
Over the last five years, Bojonegoro's annual Gross regional domestic product
(GRDP) growth has been above the national GDP growth even if Oil and Gas
sectors are excluded from its GDP (see figure 2).
Figure 3.1 GDP Growth in the Last 10 Years
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2013)
Another feature that makes Bojonegoro the exceptional case is
accountability which has been promoted in Bojonegoro since 2008. The existing
literature argues that resource-rich regions tend to undermine political institutions
that promote accountability so the elites can engage in rent-seeking activities.
Nevertheless, this general theory does not apply in Bojonegoro where the local
governments promote accountability. In the last five years, the local government
publishes "Performance and Accountability Reports" annually. In addition, the
local government hold a forum known as Forum Jumat (Friday Dialogue) to
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transfer information between citizens and local apparatus. More details about
Bojonegoro will be discussed in the chapter five.
Beside its exceptional characteristic, Bojonegoro is also an interesting case
to be explored since oil is the main natural resource. As argued by Auty (2001),
types of resources also affect the level of rent-seeking activities. The so-called
‘‘point resources’’ like oil ﬁelds, tend to result in predatory oligarchic politics
compared to other type of natural resources (Bulte et al, 2005, p 1031).  Another
fact that makes Bojonegoro a unique case is oil fields are located onshore, mostly
on public lands. This causes conﬂict of interest between local governments and
society. As emphasized by Stevens and Dietsche (2008, p 64), further research
should put greater efforts to explore the real conﬂicts of interests between actors
in natural resource-rich countries. Therefore, by picking Bojonegoro as the case,
this thesis will contribute to the ongoing debate on the resource-curse topic.
3. 4. Data Collection and General Questions
Data for this thesis would be gathered through semi-structured interview and
documentary data review. Semi-structured interviews are employed because it
will allow me to probe beyond the respondent's answers. Although the
unstructured interviews offers more flexible situation, the semi-structured
interview is more preferred since this type of interview provide a greater structure
for comparability than the unstructured interview so it is easier to make
comparison with other respondents (May, 2011). Moser and Kalton (1983)
explains that one requirement for a success interview is accessibility of
information so it is important to select the respondents who have information that
is needed. Thus, I select the informants through purposeful-sampling technique in
which accessibility of information is the main consideration when choosing
interviewees. Documentary data are used in conjunction with interviews. In this
thesis, documents that will be analysed are government reports, minutes of
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meeting, newspapers and previous studies. In addition, several existing literatures
such as book, journals, and paper are used.
According to Pedersen (2013, p 123), the collection of empirical
observations should be directed by theory and it aims to test if the predicted
evidence for a hypothesized part of a mechanism is present in the empirical
record. Consequently the strategy to gather data depends on the theoretical
framework which has been discussed in the previous section. Here I explain
methods of each variables and try to discuss how it relates to the dependent
variables: accountability.
The first variable within local level analysis is electoral system in
Bojonegoro. Since 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a gradual shift on governance
system towards more decentralized authority. Therefore, I investigate differences
on the local election system before and after 2008. Document reviews on national
policies were conducted to find out the differences. In addition, interviews on
local journalists and local political observers were conducted to investigate how
electoral system affect incentives faced by politicians to promote accountability.
Citizens’ ability to act collectively (collective action) is the second variable
within local level analysis. The hypothesis of this variable is that governments
have greater incentives to promote accountability when citizens have ability to act
collectively. In order to investigate how collective actions drive local leaders to
promote accountability, I interviewed two local journalists and one local political
observer to get general picture of collective action in Bojonegoro. Based on these
interviews, it is revealed that Bojonegoro Institute is the most active local Non-
Government Organization and they lead several social movements in Bojonegoro
including research on accountability in oil management. Therefore, I interviewed
Bojonegoro Institute in order to get deeper understanding on citizens’ ability to
act collectively in Bojonegoro. In addition to the these interviews, I also
conducted documentary reviews to capture the collective action of citizens in
Bojonegoro. There were two sources that have been reviewed namely 'Bojonegoro
in number' which also explains the current situation of local organizations in
Bojonegoro and document entitled 'public reports to the local parliament.
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The first variable at the national level is rule of law. This variable is
reflected through the effort to combat corruption in Indonesia. One of major
changes at national level is the establishment of KPK. Over the last several years,
KPK has successfully prosecuted and imprisoned many high-level officials,
including the current President's in-law. Hence it has been able to create a
deterrent effect for national politicians (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010). So I
investigate to what extent they involve in local corruption investigations and how
it drives accountability. Interviews on local political observers and journalist were
conducted to find out how KPK's performance constraints the local politicians to
engage in rent-seeking activities.
The second variable within the national level is political incentives. This
variable is related to career promotion of politicians. In this case, interviews on
members of National Mandate Party - the party that nominated the current regent
were done. The intention of the interviews are to try to find out the promotion
system at the party and how the political nomination within the party is
undertaken. I have interviewed leaders of the party at the provincial level and
national level. Interviews on an independent political observer was also conducted
to find second opinion. Document reviews on the party's statute and charter was
also done to find out whether the promotion system at the party has been
institutionalised and regulated.
All of data gathered from interviews and documentary data were tested with
interviews on the current regent. However, it is high of importance to note that not
all answers from the regent were taken for granted. Double checks were also done
to check all contradictions answers.
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4 Setting the Context: Indonesia and
Decentralization Projects
In the last 20 years, decentralization has been a main policy experiment for
local developments (Bardhan, 2002, p 185). Decentralization refers to the transfer
of political, fiscal and administrative powers to sub-nationals governments
(Hadiz, 2004, p 697). Manor (1999) estimates that 80% of the world's countries
have shifted their governance towards more decentralized authority.
Decentralization has been a global phenomenon, which happens in all of the
world's regions regardless of the status of their economy, colonial histories and
geographical locations (Faguet, 2014). There are three main arguments to support
decentralisation. Firstly, decentralisation is believed to increase economic welfare
by the tailoring level of consumption to the preferences of smaller, more
homogeneous groups since the authority is closer to the citizens (Wallis and
Oates, 1988). This argument is supported by economic theory such as the Tiebout
model (1956), which suggests that decentralization will increase resource
allocation that in turn will stimulate economic growth. The basic mechanism
behind this idea is that local governments have informational advantages and a
better knowledge of the local preferences, so they are more capable than national
governments in the public goods provision (Tiebout, 1956; Klugman, 1994).
Secondly, decentralization will enable competition between regions to attract
firms and citizens. In a decentralized country, there is a risk faced by local
governments that citizens and firms move to another location that can provide
better public services. Consequently, local governments will have incentives to
perform (Martınez-Vazquez and McNab 2003; Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi, 2012).
In addition, Breton (1996) argues that with this competition, decentralization will
lower the possibility of inefficiency, rent-seeking, and corruption. Thirdly,
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decentralization is believed to increase participation, transparency and
accountability in policy-making because of the increased link between
governments and citizens. Decentralization will empower individuals and help to
generate institutions, such as greater trust, interaction and networking, which, in
turn, contribute to a reduction of transaction costs (Rodiguez-Pose, 2011, p 622).
In the case of Indonesia, the fall of Suharto in 1998 was a turning point for
the Indonesian governance system. The country had a very centralized
government under Suharto's "new order" regime that governed Indonesia from
1965 until 1998. Even though Law 5/1974 provided a framework for
decentralization that enacted the relationship between central and regional
government based on the principles decentralization, deconcetration, and co-
administration, in practice the central government dominated all level of
governments (the central government, provinces, and city or regency) (Ahmad
and Mansoor, 2000). The central government exercised significant control over
the appointment of local officials and uses of funds by these officials (Shah, 1999
in Ahmad and Mansoor, 2002, p 3). After experiencing a centralized government
during the 32 years of Suharto's regime, Indonesia witnessed a shift in the
governance system towards more decentralized authority.
There are several factors that push for decentralization in Indonesia. first
catalyst for decentralization was the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. At that time,
Indonesia experienced the drastic reversal of a long period of high GDP growth
rates, from 7–8% annually to negative growth of close to 14%; a 50% cut in
income per capita in dollar terms; a sizeable reversal in private capital flows (the
estimates range between $25 and $40 billion); a jump in the inflation rate from
single digits to 80%; and an 80% depreciation in the rupiah in less than 12 months
(Djiawandono, 2000; p 51). This crisis lost the central government its bargaining
power against outspoken students and resilient local elites. Amidst the crisis,
regional leaders contested for autonomy (Kristiansen and Pratikno, 2006; 516).
Secondly, the East Timor's secession signaled to the national politicians that
decentralization was a solution to hold the country together. The fear of national
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disintegration made the decentralization's initiative more urgent (Miller, 2006:
297)
Two laws were introduced in May 1999 as pillars for decentralization in
Indonesia. The first law, Law 22/1999 on Local Government outlined a new
hierarchical relation in the Indonesian governance system. It replaced the old
system, which linked local governments to the centre, with a new one that granted
local governments considerably greater autonomy. The law states that regional
governments which consist of provinces, districts, and municipalities will have
full autonomy to ‘govern and administer the interest of the local people’ within
the boundary of the 'unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia'. Autonomy refers
to authority for local governments to regulate everything but international politics,
defence and security, the judicature, monetary matters, religion and other fields.
In addition, it states that kabupaten (regency) and kota (municipality) are not in a
hierarchical relation to the provincal and central government. This is also a
consequence of changing the election system at the local level. Law 22/1999 also
introduced the direct local election of Local Assemblies (DPRD) who had
authority to elect head of municipalities (Mayor or Walikota) or head of regency
(Regent or Bupati). The inter-governmental relationship is visualized by figure 4.1
Figure 4.1 Hierarchical relation in Indonesian governance system
Source: Matsui and Kuncoro (2003) in Suhendra (2006)
The second law, Law 25/1999 on Central and Local Fiscal Balance concerns
fiscal and finance issues. It provides a framework to regulate the fiscal relations
between the central government and local governments through an
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intergovernmental transfers system. It enacts two new and important
intergovernmental grants: the General Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum
(DAU), an equalization grant over which sub-national governments have
complete authority, and the Special Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK)),
a collection of speciﬁc-purpose grants. Through these two grants, local
governments are given full autonomy to manage and spend the grant
(Brodjonegoro, 2004). Besides inter-government grants, local governments also
have the authority to collect their own regional revenues through local taxes and
levies, local state owned enterprises' revenues, and other local revenues including
revenues from natural resources. Through these two laws, powers were relocated
from central government to regional governments. In 2001, both laws officially
comes into force and it embarks one of the most ambitious programs of
decentralization in the world (World Bank, 2007). The current local governments
in Indonesia have more power to regulate their regions compared with 20 years
ago.
However, 15 years after decentralization was introduced in Indonesia, some
people argue that decentralization does not always work in the way it is supposed
to. One such argument is decentralization has been captured by local elites that
were nurtured and incubated under the old regime. As mentioned before,
decentralization in Indonesia was pushed and demanded by local elites since they
believed that the decentralization process would allow them to have greater direct
access to a variety of material resources. There are, at least, two ways for local
elites to capture the decentralization process. Firstly, decentralization, which
enables local parliaments to exercise more authority, has made local parliaments
become sites of corrupt deal-making in which legislators colludes with officials
and businesspeople to siphon off money from the state budget to direct contracts
and licenses to business allies (Aspinall, 2010 p 27). Secondly, decentralization
has enabled predatory behaviour at the local level. In some out-of-the-way
districts, decentralization has produced a phenomenon similar to the “local
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bossism”1 that characterizes neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and
Thailand where local clans govern their districts. “Money politics,” in the form of
vote-buying and bribery of electoral officials, has had particularly damaging
effects on the integrity of electoral processes at the local level (Ibid, p 27). Hence,
decentralization has moved not only power from central governments to local
governments, but also corruption and patronage politics to the local level.
1 Local Bossism is a term introduced by Sidel (1999) to express local people who have power to
capture democracy and decentralization at the local level. There are several terms that have the
same meaning such as local strongman or local gangster which have been used by Hadiz (2011)
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5 Bojonegoro: Reversal of fortune
This chapter explains the current situations in Bojonegoro. The first section of this
chapter discusses the situation in Bojonegoro from economic perspective.
Meanwhile, the situation of Bojonegoro in the governance context is presented on
the second section. The second section explains the practice of accountability in
Bojonegoro which is the central phenomena of this thesis. This section uses time
frame of before and after oil discovery.
5. 1. From a Poor Region To a New Texas
Bojonegoro is a regency located on the East Java, Indonesia. Before the oil
discovery, this regency was regarded as one of the poorest region in Indonesia. In
1984, this regency received international attention when C.L.M Penders, an
Australian researcher, published a book entitled Bojonegoro 1900-1942. A Story
of Endemic Poverty in North-East Java. In this book, he describes the story of
poverty in Bojonegoro during the colonialisation period. He explains that during
that period, people in Bojonegoro suffered from severe malnutrition. Based on a
dietary survey in five villages in Bojonegoro conducted by the National Nutrition
Institute (Instituut voor Volksvoeding), they found that most families were
receiving well below the stipulated minimum of 1,500 calories per day (see figure
5.1 to see calorie per capita in Bojonegoro and other regions in Indonesia). Poor
diet made the population more prone to malaria, which in turn made hunger
oedema more widespread (Penders in Booth, 2012). Due to its location on the
banks of the Bengawan Solo river, the largest river in Java, flooding hit
Bojonegoro every year and is still a recurring event. This routine disaster reduces
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agriculture productivity and cause endemic poverty in Bojonegoro (Penders,
1984).
Figure 5. 1. Total, Kcal per Capita per Day in 19462
Source: Van der Eng, P. (2008)
Sixty years later, in the early 2000, poverty was still part of many people's
lives in Bojonegoro. Figure 6.2 reveals the poverty line in Bojonegoro and other
neighbouring regencies situated in East Java. It can be seen that Bojonegoro was
among the poorest regions in East Java. While there has been a gradual decrease
in the level of poverty since 2001, the number was still higher than other
regencies and national poverty line.
2 Calories is used as an indicator of poverty due to lack available data during colonialisation.
However, it is valid to capture poverty as argued by Ahmed (2000). Ahmed, A. (2000) Trends
in consumption, nutrition, and poverty. In Out of the  shadow of famine: Evolving food
markets and food policy in Bangladesh, ed. R.  Ahmed, S. Haggblade, and T. E. Chowdury.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University  Press.
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Figure 5. 2. Poverty Headcount in Bojonegoro and Other Neighbouring Regions
(2001-2007)
Source: McCulloch (2007)
As economic theories predict, Bojonegoro suffers from poverty due to low
productivity in the region. In 2004, Agriculture was the main sector in the region
and accounted for 36% of their Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP). Sixty-
six percent of Bojonegoro's citizens worked in the agriculture sector, but most of
them were farm workers who did not have own land. They accounted for 48% of
total population (Central Bureau of Statistic Bojonegoro Regency, 2013).
In April 2001, a new hope was raised as Exxon-Mobil discovered new oil
fields in the Cepu Block. Administratively, the Cepu Block is located in two
regencies namely Blora and Bojonegoro, but most of the oil fields are situated
within Bojonegoro's jurisdiction. Hence, most of oil exploration activities are
centralized in Bojonegoro. Exxon-Mobil estimated that this new oil field has
provenoil reserves of over 600 million barrels, worth more than USD 24 billion on
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the 2009 global markets. However, the estimation has been a source of debate as
Lembaga Minyak dan Gas (Oil and Gas Organization), suggests different figures.
They believe that the Cepu Block has 1,4 billion barrels. Cepu Block itself consist
of several oil fields such as Banyu Urip, Alas Dara, Alas Tua West, Alas Tua
East, Jambaran, Cendana, and Sukowati. Among these newly discovered oil
fields, Banyu Urip is considered as the main oil field as it has a design production
capacity of up to 165 thousand barrels of oil per day at peak production period
(Huda, 2011).
With more than 600 million barrels of proven oil reserves, Cepu Block is
regarded as the biggest oil discovery in Indonesia in decades, and one of biggest
oil fields in Indonesia. In peak production, they contribute 20 percent of
Indonesia’s oil production. These oil fields are expected to give Bojonegoro $88
million and increase Bojonegoro's budget by three times. Consequently,
Bojonegoro will be one of richest regencies in Indonesia. Because of this, Reuters
called Bojonegoro 'Indonesia's Texas' (Reuters, 2009). When Bojonegoro received
massive media coverage as a new rich region, people in Bojonegoro started
believing that the discovery would have a positive impact on their lives. This
glimpse of hope became even higher among the people since Cepu Block is
located in the poorest and most isolated sub-districts in Bojonegoro (Huda, 2011).
Ten years after the oil discovery, oil has started contributing to Bojonegoro's
economy. In the last 5 years, Bojonegoro has enjoyed a high level of economic
growth, 8,78% on average. Consequently, their GRDP has increased by more than
100% (Rp 8,2 trillion to Rp 17,7 trillion). The annual GRDP growth in the last 5
years have contributed to poverty reduction in Bojonegoro. The figure 6.3 reveals
poverty line in Bojonegoro compared to other neighbouring regencies. While
poverty line in Bojonegoro is still higher than Ngajuk and Jombang, the poverty
line in Bojonegoro is declining.
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Figure 5. 3. Poverty Headcount in Bojonegoro and Other Neighbouring Regions
(2008-2011)
Source: World Bank (2014)
Looking closer at the structure of economy, it can be said that oil is the main
contributor to this economic miracle. Once dominated by the agriculture sector,
now oil is the cornerstone of Bojonegoro's economy and accounts for more than
44% of their GRDP.
Figure 5.4. Bojonegoro's Structure of the Economy
Source: Central Bureau of Statistic (2012)
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5. 2. From Government 1.0 to Government 4.0
Over the years, Bojonegoro was not only recognized as one of the poorest
regions but also one of the most incompetent and unaccountable governments in
Indonesia. A study from McCulloch (2007) confirmed this presumption. He
analyzed economic characteristics and performance of Indonesia's districts using
data gathered by KPPOD/Asia Foundation survey of Local Economic Governance
in 2007, which covers 243 regencies and cities in Indonesia. They surveyed
around 50 firms in each regencies and cities and asked about nine major aspects of
local economic governance. The aspects are: access to information, access to land
and security of tenure, business licensing, local Government and business
interaction, business development programs, capacity and integrity of the
mayor/regent, local taxes, user charges and other transaction costs, local
Infrastructure, and security and conflict resolution. Based on the survey, several
governance indexes such as mayor/regents' integrity, opinion on local civil
servants, access to information, licensing system in Bojonegoro were among the
worst in Indonesia.
Nanang Fakhrudi, a local journalist also confirms the problem of
unaccountable governments in Bojonegoro (Interview, NF 2014). One of the
biggest scandals in Bojonegoro was participating interest in oil exploration and
production. As enacted by the President Regulation Number 35 Year 2004, the
contractors are required to offer a 10% participating interest to a Regional
Government-Owned Enterprise (BUMD) after the first Plan of Development has
been approved (Mahiddin and Aziz, 2013). This regulation was introduced to
provide a legal framework for local governments to participate in oil exploration,
development and production in their regions. In addition, this regulation was
intended to enable local government to receive profit from oil production beside
taxes and intergovernmental grants (Interview with Purwanto, 2014). However, in
the case of Bojonegoro, PT Asri Dharma Sejahtera (PT ADS), which is a
Regional Government-Owned Enterprise in Bojonegoro, share their stock with a
47
private investor namely PT Surya Energi Raya (PT SER), owned by Surya Paloh,
a national politician and former Chief of Advisory Board of Golkar Party
(Suharto's Party). This partnership set up the profit sharing 75% for PT SER and
25% for the local government through PT ADS (Huda, 2011).
The decision-making process to share the local government's stock to PT
SER has drawn massive criticism from the local people. They accused the
government of not being transparent and accountable during the process. Not only
did the critics come from the local people but also from a member of local
parliament, Qohar Mahmudi who admitted that the decision of local parliament to
approve government's proposal on stock sharing was invalid. As reported by Huda
(2011) Qohar described that most of the members at the local parliament accepted
the proposal without any discussion among them about its details. Furthermore, he
argued that the decision was invalid because there was an indication that several
members of parliament accepted bribes from PT SER in favour of the local
government's proposal (Ibid). A local informant and a national journalist also
claimed this allegation. Rosnan, a local informant reported that one month before
the proposal was approved by the local parliament, there was a meeting at
Shangri-la Hotel in Surabaya between Surya Paloh (owner of PT SER), Taman
Saifuddin (the Bojonegoro Local Parliament's Speaker) and H.M Santoso (the
regent of Bojonegoro) to strategize in assuring PT SER to be chosen as the private
partner of PT ADS (Ibid). This process shows how collaboration between local
politicians, a local leader, and businessman to engage rent-seeking activities
works. Both Surya Paloh and Taman Saifuddin are members of Golkar Party and
although H.M Santoso is politically independent, he is retired general who was
incubated during Suharto's regime. In addition, vice regent M. Thalhah was a
local elite of Golkar Party hence it strengthened the position of PT SER and Surya
Paloh (Ibid).
Nevertheless, there is a gradual increase of the local government's
accountability in Bojonegoro. In 2009, Bojonegoro became centre of the spotlight
when Otto Scharmer, a professor from Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) wrote the local government's practice in Bojonegoro. He argues that the
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local government in Bojonegoro practices something that he calls as a
Government 4.0 which deepens democratic forms by making them more direct,
distributed, dialogic, and digital. There are several improvements on governance
system that have been made by the current local government:
1. Dialog Jumat (Friday Dialogue) is an institution created by the current
regent to transfer information between citizens and local apparatus.
Every Friday afternoon, a dialogue held in the Town Hall where all
citizens are invited and which all top civil servants are required to attend.
The dialogue goes both ways in which governments explain their works
and anyone who attend can ask any question and complaint to the
government. Most of the questions and complaints have to be solved
immediately. Several local informants argue that this dialogue is very
effective to solve the problem (KanalBojonegoro, 2014). One simple
examples is when a citizen complains about the licensing system that is
not free from illegal payment. Immediately, a person who was
responsible for the licensing was asked to give money back to the citizen.
This mechanism has been institutionalized formally as a local regulations
on transparency and accountability introduced (Interview with Purwanto,
2014).
2. Every year the local government publishes "Performance and
Accountability Reports" (Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi
Pemerintah or LAKIP). Since 1999, all government institutions at all
governance level are required to submit LAKIP as enacted by the
Presidential Instruction number 7 year 1999. Nevertheless, the local
government in Bojonegoro has published this report only since 2008.
Suyoto argues that this one part of promoting accountability in
Bojonegoro.
All of these mechanisms have moved Bojonegoro from Government 1.0 in which
decisions were made centrally and without transparency and accountability to
Government 4.0 with open and accountable policies-making process. In addition,
these improvements have shows the promotion of accountability in Bojonegoro.
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According to Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2009), a government can be argued
promoting accountability if the government's performance of tasks or functions
are subject to another’s oversight, direction or request that they provide
information or justification for their actions. Through these two mechanism, other
actors including local people and national government have an opportunity to ask
justification of the local government's policies and performance.
Once regarded as one the most incompetent and unaccountable governments
in Indonesia now Bojonegoro is a shining example of how a local government
practices good governance. In 2011 and 2012, Bojonegoro was chosen as one of
the ten best regencies nation-wide according to various quality assessments, and
received multiple prestigious awards for low levels of corruption and high levels
of service quality (Scharmer and Kauferthe, 2013). Not only do the recognition as
a local government that practice transparency and accountability come from the
national level but also from the international level as told by Joko Purwanto,
Director of Bojonegoro Institute. He stated:
"Many scholars around the world said that there are several examples of
accountability and transparency in oil management at the national level such
as Norway but nothing at the local level. After hearing Bojonegoro's
experiences, they said: "finally we got a success example at the local level".
Now we are often invited to international conferences to share about practice
of accountability and transparency in Bojonegoro."
Oil booms enjoyed by Bojonegoro do not lead to excessive government
spending and patronage spending as predicted by several scholar such as
Robinson et al (2006, p 449) and Stevens and Dietsche (2008, p 57). Instead of
spending their revenue on unproductive spending to satisfy political interest, the
local government spends oil revenues to sustainable projects such as trainings for
local people (Interview with Purwanto 2014; Kanal Bojonegoro, 2014; Suara
Bayu Urip, 2014).
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6 Local level
6. 1. Electoral System in Bojonegoro
The first variable within local level analysis is the electoral system whereby
electoral theories of democracy are the main argument of this factor. Electoral
theories of democracy suggest that elected governments are responsive and
accountable to public demand because the public can give rewards and
punishments to the politicians through the elections. The elections enable citizens
to remove politicians who fail to fulfil their promises during their tenures and
elect good politicians who perform and promote accountability. The election
system therefore becomes a very important institution in shaping politicians'
behaviours. If the politicians want to be re-elected in the next election, they have
to promote accountability and listen to citizens. This argument is similar to a
theory that argues that democracy has a positive impact on accountability since
rulers in democratic countries have incentives to listen to what people want if they
seek the supports in the next elections (Sen, 1999). In addition, Seabright (1996)
argues that accountability of local officials is also related to the electoral
mechanism to elect local larders -whether they are elected by local election or
central authority. His study reveals that elected local officials may be valuable in
improving accountability of governments to their citizens compared to elected by
central officials. Hence, it is important to analyze the electoral system in
Bojonegoro to understand how political system at the local level creates
incentives for the local government to promote accountability.
Looking at broader picture, regime transition from the New Order to the
Reformasi has been a turning point in changing election systems in Indonesia.
During the period of New Order, the President was elected by members of
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parliament instead of by people. Since the parliament was dominated by
Golongan Karya (GOLKAR), which was the Suharto's party, Suharto was able to
receive majority votes during his 32 years' regime. The fall of Suharto in 1998 has
given a momentum to change the electoral systems in Indonesia. However, the
change did not happen overnight as the first election in the Reformasi era in 1999
only elected member of parliaments. President and Vice President for the period
1999-2004 were elected by the member of parliaments who were elected through
General Election in 1999. Three years later, the People's Consultative Assembly
modify the Constitution of Indonesia which enable the change in the President and
Vice Presidential election. Therefore, it was the 2004 Presidential election that for
very first time people elected the President and Vice President directly.
The change in electoral system also occurred at the local level. Law 22/1999
on Regional Government enacted that leaders of local government: Regents
(Bupati), Mayor (Walikota), and Governors (Gubernur) were to be elected by
local parliaments, with each party caucus allowed to nominate one candidate
(Buehler, 2010). Consequently, it changed the mechanism in electing local
leaders, whereby during Suharto's regime local leaders were appointed by central
government. In the case of Bojonegoro, the first election was held in 2002. At that
time, H.M Santoso, a retired general was elected as a Bojonegoro's regent by local
parliaments. He was nominated by Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or National
Awakening Party, which controlled 26% of total seats. Nevertheless, this
mechanism has been criticized as the source of money politics at the local level.
Buehler (2010) argues that local parliaments used their power for rent-seeking
purposes by selling their vote in exchange for money from candidates aspiring to
run for executive positions. It was also stated by a local informant that there was
indication of money politics on election day in 2002 (Interview with Fakhrudin,
2014).
In 2004, a new regulation was introduced. Law 32/2004 on Local
Government, which was enacted by the National Assembly in late 2004, has been
a legal basis to hold local election (Pilkada) at provincial level and city or regency
level. It outlined that regents and mayors were to be elected directly by the people
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for the first time in 2005 (Buehler, 2010). This new electoral system, which
enables citizens to elect regent directly, has been a very powerful tool to give
reward and punishment to local leaders. The reward and punishment are reflected
in the 2007 and the 2012 local election in Bojonegoro.
As mandated by national law, the regent and vice regent of Bojonegoro for
the period 2008-2013 had to be elected directly by citizens of Bojonegoro through
the 2007 local election. There were three candidates that ran for the regent and
vice regent. The first candidate was M Thalhah and Tamam Syaifudin. They were
nominated by Golkar Party and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Karya
Peduli Bangsa (PKPB) dan Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR). These parties had
25 seats (55%) in the local parliament. M.Thalhah was the vice regent of
Bojonegoro from 2003–2008. He had held various positions within the Golkar
party including as the chairman of the party at the regency level. The second
candidate was H.M Santoso and Budi Irawanto who were nominated by Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P), Partai Demokrat (PD), Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). This coalition had 13 seats (28%) in local parliament.
H.M Santoso was regent of Bojonegoro from the period 2003-2008. The last
candidate was the eventual winner of the 2007 local election: Suyoto and Setyo
Hartono. They were nominated by Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan and Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan (PNBK) who
were relatively small parties in Bojonegoro with only 7 seats (17%) in the local
parliament. Since the threshold to nominate a candidate was 6 seats so Suyoto and
Setyo Hartana were still able to run in the election (Interview with Fakhrudin,
2014).
Table 6.1. Candidates for the 2007 Local Election
No Candidate Party Total Seats
1 M Thalhah - Tamam Syaifudin PKB, PKPB, PBR 25
2 H.M Santoso - Budi Irawanto PDI-P, PD, PKS 13
3 Suyoto - Setyo Hartono PAN, PPP, PNBK 7
Source: Central Bureau of Statistic of Bojonegoro (2013)
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At that time, many predicted that only the first and second candidate that
competed in the election. There were three reasons behind this prediction. Firstly,
both candidates were incumbent who were believed to have controls to influence
local apparatus at the grass-roots level. Secondly, both candidates had strong
political support in Bojonegoro. For instance, the first candidates were nominated
by several big parties such as the Golkar and PKB. These two parties were the
winning parties in the previous general election. The second candidate was still
predicted to have a chance since he was the regent who was considered to have
more power than the first candidate (the vice-regent). Although he was nominated
by relatively smaller parties than the first candidates, he was still regarded as a
tough contender for the first candidate. Thirdly, the popularity of the third
candidate was very low in Bojonegoro. Although Suyoto was a native
Bojonegoro, he spent almost his life outside Bojonegoro. The previous political
position that he held was a member of province parliament, which was located in
Surabaya (about 110 kilometres east of from Bojonegoro) (Interview with Anas,
2014).
Nevertheless, the third candidate, who was once considered as a
'consolation candidate', won the election with 279,296 (37%) popular vote and
broke all predictions. One reason why he was able to won the election was
because people perceived that the incumbent failed to improve the quality of life
in Bojonegoro and failed to promote accountability during his tenure (Interview
with Anas, Fakhrudin, Purwanto, 2014). At the same time, Suyoto offered
programs that fit with local needs. Suyoto's campaign used the slogan: "Develop
Bojonegoro more than Lamongan, (a neighbouring regency)". He argued that this
slogan was used because there were many people who felt that living in
Lamongan was much easier than in Bojonegoro. Instead of using posters and
billboards, he used more direct communications with the voters. He admitted
these strategies were more effective to express his program and listen the voters
and also much cheaper than using posters and billboard (Interview with Suyoto,
2014). Thus, the 2007 local election has shown how politicians were punished
through the election. The new election system which enables local people to
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choose their regent directly has given the opportunity to a new politician to win
the election. Suyoto admitted that if the old mechanism was used where the local
parliament elected the regent, he might lose since he was not nominated by
majority of parties that had seats at the local parliament (Interview with Suyoto,
2014).
Meanwhile, the 2012 local election was a moment when citizens gave
rewards to a good politician. As a successful incumbent, Suyoto was re-elected by
an even wider margin (320,536 popular votes or 44.38%). He won in 22 of 27
sub-districts in Bojonegoro even though other candidates were backed by
powerful industrial interest (Scharmer and Kaufer, 2013). One major feature of
the 2012 local election was all eligible citizens are able run in the local election.
This is consequence of Constitutional Court's rule that candidacy for local
government should be open to all eligible citizens, not just candidates supported
by political parties. Thus, in the 2012 Bojonegoro local election, there were five
candidates: there candidates were nominated by parties and the other two
candidates were independent. This composition reflected the old political
constellation which competed in the previous election. Beside Suyoto, Golkar
Party and PDI-P were still two major powers in Bojonegoro who endorsed
candidates. Meanwhile, the other parties decided to set up coalition with these two
big parties. Golkar Party nominated M.Thalhah-Budiyanto and PDI-P supported
M Choiri-Untung Basuki. Although Suyoto had the highest electability, these two
old major powers in Bojonegoro still decided to nominated their own candidates
because they wanted to take over power, including to engage in rent-seeking
activities that were used to exercise before Suyoto's period (Interview with Riska,
2014).
The story of local election in Bojonegoro shows that direct election is the
best way for the citizens to give punishments and rewards to politicians.
According to Buehler (2010), voters are now more powerful than at any other
time in Indonesian history, leading to significant improvements in the formal
structures of accountability at the local level. This is in line with an argument
from Cleary (2007) who argues that elections are best tools for producing
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responsiveness and to promote accountability. Electoral theories of democracy use
reward-punishment mechanism as a frame to argue that direct election is an
effective institution in shaping politicians' incentives to promote accountability. In
the case of Bojonegoro, the difference in electing the regent is one reason why the
current regent promotes accountability. Suyoto admitted that the fact he was
chosen directly by the people forces him to promote accountability (Interview
with Suyoto, 2014).
However, there are also other factors of the electoral system that shape the
incentives of the regent to promote accountability. Based on my fieldwork, I
identified there are other factors that affect election system which in turn drive the
regent to introduce accountability in Bojonegoro. The first factor is practice of
money politics (vote-buying). Vicente and Wantchekon (2010) argues that the
practice of vote-buying is major obstacle to accountability since the voters will
vote based on the money they receive, not based on the performance of the
candidates. In addition, another important impact of money politics is a high-cost
politics in which the candidates have to spend a large amount of money to finance
their campaigns. If such politicians are elected, they have to pay back money that
has been spent during the election. In this situation, they tend to engage in rent-
seeking activities and deteriorate institutions of accountability. Therefore, practice
of vote-buying has negative correlations with politicians' incentives to promote
accountability. As reported by Fakhrudin, there was only one case of money
politics that was reported to the local agency of election control. However, this
case never brought before a court since there was little evidence to support the
case (Interview, Fakhrudin, 2014).
A second factor is a high level of political competition. This factor is also
closely-related to the electoral theories because political competition is one
feature of the election that affects incentives faced by politicians. One proposition
in this topic is the connection between political competition and democracy.
Democracy is considered superior to autocracy in promoting accountability due to
a high political competition. Sen (1999) argued that the rulers in democratic
countries have the incentive to listen to what people want if they seek supporters
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in elections. However, political competitions can vary even across democratic
regions, although they practice the same election system (Williams, 2009). Keefer
and Khemain (2005) argue that different political competition affects the
incentives.
In the case of Bojonegoro, Suyoto was nominated by PAN, which is the
party of an Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah. Along with Nahdatul Ulama
(NU), they are two biggest Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the
East Java province is widely known for having a strong domination of the NU
(Lidle and Munjani, 2004, p 111). According to Haris (2005), the role of Kiai
(religious leaders of NU) in East Java are very crucial. People who are Kiai
descent with the title of Gus or Ning have a higher possibility of winning in a
election. The role of Kiai is not only as a cultural broker but also as a interpreter
of social-politic realities (Haris, 2005). The domination of NU in the local politics
can be seen from the General Election in 1999, 2004, and 2014 whereby PKB,
which is a party of NU, won the election at the provincial level with 36%, 24%,
and 19% of total popular vote, respectively. At the district level, the figure was
more striking whereby PKB dominated the local parliament seats with 12 seats
(26%) in the period 1999-2004 and 14 seats (31%) in the period 2004-2009.
Meanwhile, PAN only got 3 seats and 5 seats in the period 1999-2004 and 2004-
2009, respectively (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2013).
The political constellation in Bojonegoro push Suyoto to obtain supports
from other group beside traditional supporter that come from PAN and
Muhammdiyah. As he stated that:
"If I only rely on PAN and Muhammadiyah, I will not be re-elected since
these two organizations are relatively small. Therefore, in order to be re-
elected, I have to promote accountability so I can obtain supports from the
swing-voters."
This situation, to some extent, confirm arguments of Morrow et al (2001) who
emphasizes that political leaders who obtain supports from more heterogeneous
groups (large winning coalition) tend to promote accountability and provide
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available resources in public goods. They argue that in order to stay at the office,
the politicians have to maintain the loyalty of the winning coalition. When the
winning coalition is small, a leader only needs the support of a few individuals to
stay in office. Nevertheless, this option is no longer feasible when the winning
coalition is large because each member’s share of the private goods is shrinking
compared to small winning coalition. At a certain point, the provision of private
goods is no longer an efficient way to maintain the coalition. Consequently, it is
better for leaders of large winning coalitions to maintain their supporters by
investing a greater proportion of available resources in public goods and
promoting accountability (Ibid, p 62).
6. 2. Collective Action in Bojonegoro
Collective actions are the second variables at the local level analysis. This
variable is based on participatory theories which suggest that governments will
promote accountability if the citizens have the ability to act collectively. Keefer
(2011) argues that in countries where citizens have ability to act collectively,
governments have greater incentives to pursue public policies in the public
interest and face greater costs if they expropriate private investors. Among the
literatures of decentralisation, collective action has been emphasized as a major
feature of decentralisation. The transfer of power from central to local
governments is one way to increase public participation. It is expected that
citizens will actively participate in the different stages of policies: policy-making,
policy-implementation, and policy-evaluation (Lane, 2003, p 360-361; Rodiguez-
Pose, 2011, p 622). International agencies such as World Bank also relates
decentralisation project with the citizens' participation in public policy. According
to Hadiz (2010, p 32), the World Bank believes that a vibrant civil-society
contributes to good governance and democratisation at the local level by ensuring
greater public participation in development. Decentralisation is considered as one
solution to enable local communities to have a better position to demand
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accountability and adequate provision of services (Grindle 2007: 12). In addition,
decentralization is helpful in setting the institutional environment for the
nurturance of the social capital necessary for a vibrant civil society. Through this,
local governments and local civil society can work together to promote good
governance in their regions (Hadiz, 2010 p 31). The idea that decentralisation will
increase public participation and build a vibrant civil society has been one major
feature in decentralisation projects around the world. One example is Local
Government Code which was introduced in Philippine in 1991. As argued by
Shatkin, this regulation was expected to have a positive implication for civil
society (Shatkin, 2004).
The idea of civil society as a major feature of a decentralisation's project has
been spread all around the world. Indonesia is no exception. When
decentralisation project was embarked in Indonesia in 1999, there was a big hope
that decentralisation would promote a vibrant civil society that had been
disorganized under Suharto's regime. The fall of Suharto in 1998 was a major
event that enabled the emergence of collective action in Indonesia. The downfall
of Suharto provided an opportunity for civil society to consolidate (Clarke, 1998).
However, some people are sceptics of the growth of civil society in the post
Suharto era. According to Hadiz (2011) the Suharto regime left legacy of a weak
civil society and the complete absence of left-wing political or any other
organizations. He argues that although decentralisation has enabled a greater
scope for political participation, the result is very little discernible empowerment
of people who had already been marginalised under centralised authoritarian. The
marginalized working class still have not been able to overcome the legacy of
Suharto's regime that imposed a highly state-centred authoritarian corporatist
framework to prohibit independent sources of political power and systematic
disorganization of civil society. (Hadiz, 2003; p 597).
Bojonegoro might be the expectation because a vibrant civil society has
emerged in Bojonegoro in the last seven years. One important figure that reflects a
vibrant civil society in Bojonegoro is the increasing number of social
organisations registered in the local government. Prior to 2006, there were only 44
59
organisations were registered. In 2009, the number increases by more than 4 times
in which 189 organisation were registered in the regency. Most of them are
identified as a Non-Government Organisation (NGO) (Bakesbangpolinmas in
Huda, 2011).
Table 6.2. Civil Society in Bojonegoro
Number Type of Organisation Total
1. Non-Governmental Organisation 87
2. Profesional Organization 12
3. Youth Organization 22
4. Religious Organization 35
5. Others 33
Source: Bakesbangpolinmas in Huda (2011)
During the fieldwork, I worked closely with Director of Bojonegoro
Institute, Joko Purwanto. He described their initiatives in Bojonegoro in pushing
accountability. He argued that one important strategy in accountability promotion
in Bojonegoro is by increasing demand from the citizen on the governments.
Consequently, Bojonegoro Institute gives civic educations to local people about
their rights. This is in line with what emphasized by Lewis (2010, p 649): "one
solutions to improve accountability at the local level is by giving education to
citizens about their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis local public services". Joko
Purwanto argues that this initiative has helped the people to realize their rights
and they have started demanding for accountability from the local government.
Several activities that aim to improve accountability of local government also
have been initiated. One example is Bojonegoro Institute developed a tool that
visualized the local government's budget and its distribution to the sub-district
levels. Joko Purwanto argues that this tool enables local people to track
government's spending channelled to their villages. He also stated that Forum
Jumat (Friday Dialogue) is one institution of accountability that was initiated by
the local NGOs and the local governments. He described that there was a fear
among the people that the newly elected regent would fail to deliver his promises
as the previous regent did. Therefore, some people asked Suyoto to create a
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mechanism that enables them to demand Suyoto to fulfil his promises. Suyoto
accepted this request and proposed a forum where everyone can attend and ask
anything to the local government. Then, after Suyoto was elected in 2007, several
NGOs including Bojonegoro Institute were invited to set up the forum. After
holding several meetings, it was decided that the forum will be held every Friday
after Friday Prayers in the town hall (See Chapter 5 for more details about Friday
Dialogue) (Interview with Purwanto, 2014).
In addition, Bojonegoro also gave training for local civil servants in
calculating income sharing from oil revenue. In the past, the calculation of income
sharing was centralized in the central government. The local government did have
prior knowledge to calculate lifting and revenue from oil. Consequently, they just
accepted data from the national government. In more extreme situation, Joko
Purwanto described that there were negotiations between the local government
and national agency on oil revenue. If the local government wanted a higher
income sharing, they had to bribe staffs in the national agency. In order to prevent
this problem, Bojonegoro Institute trained 15 local civil servants on how to
calculate income sharing based on cost recovery, lifting, domestic market
obligations, tax, international price. Joko Purwanto argued that this knowledge
has improved the local governments and prevented staffs from the national agency
from engaging in rent-seeking activities (Interview with Purwanto, 2014).
However, it is also important to discuss factors that shape a vibrant civil
society in Bojonegoro. In this case, one argument of Williams et al (2009) about
the strength of collective action can be used. They argue that, there are four
factors that strengthen collective action in Bojonegoro: the urgency and
importance of the issue at stake, their internal divisions and conflicts of interest,
their lobbying capacity and the likelihood that their actions will have an influence
on government. In the case of Bojonegoro, all these factor appear and increase the
strength of collective action.
The first factor is the urgency and importance of the issue at stake. The
increased number of social organization in Bojonegoro is attributed to the
discovery of oil in the beginning of century. As described in the previous section,
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Bojonegoro was one of the poorest region in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the oil
discovery raised the hope among local people that their lives would change. As
argued by Lewis (2010), this rising expectation might in turn be anticipated to
lead to increased demand for quality public services and, ultimately, induce
pressure on local governments to supply improved services and promote
accountability. Nevertheless, the failure of the previous regent to fulfil the local
people's dreams encouraged some people to form NGOs to demand accountability
from the local government. Joko Purwanto told that he formed Bojonegoro
Institute with his friends due to lack of transparency and accountability from the
local government. Participating interest's scandal that involved several local
politicians was a catalyst for their initiative (see Chapter 5.2 for more details
about the scandal). They believe that it is important to establish a NGO to control
the local government's so that in the future similar scandals can be prevented
(Interview with Purwanto, 2014).
The second factor is internal divisions and conflicts of interest of local
organizations. Williams et al (2009) argue this problem will reduce the strength of
collective action since it pose problem of free-rider in which the members of a
large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare so they will not act
to advance their common group objectives unless there is coercion to force them
to do so. Consequently, each member of the group prefers that another member
pay the entire cost (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). Thus, collective action does not
necessarily mean positive for development since it could also lead to extractive
rent-seeking activities by small elite groups (Williams et al, 2009).
The internal division appears in Bojonegoro as Huda (2011) argues that the
number of NGOs is increasing because they want to be a contractor for Exxon
Mobile's community development projects. As one requirement to be a contractor
is having registered at the local governments so a group of people starts
registering their organisation. In addition, he also described that some people form
NGOs in order to have access to BANSOS (Bantuan Sosial or social grants) from
the local governments.
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Although the motivations of the NGOs vary, Joko Purwanto believes this
diversity is an advantage in calling for accountability from the local governments
since it strengthens the social movement in Bojonegoro. In Bojonegoro, several
coalitions have been formed with different fields and goals such coalition for
budget transparency, coalition in oil and gas management, and women coalition.
However, all coalitions have the same main purpose- namely better public
services and accountability from the local governments (Interview, Purwanto,
2014). Therefore, it can be argued that the collective action in Bojonegoro more
reflects what Putnam called as social capital instead of what Olson named as a
distributional coalitions that harm societies and economies.
The third factor is the capability of local organization. In this case, it is
important to emphasize the role of international NGOs. According to Hadiz et al
(2003), one problem of civil society at the local level lies on their lack of
capabilities due to centralized government during Suharto's regime that obstructed
the rise of civil society in Indonesia. Therefore, several international NGOs gave
trainings to national and local NGOs so they can act collectively and demand for
accountability and transparency from the local government. Revenue Watch
Institute (RWI) and Open Society Foundations Local and Government and Public
Service Reform Initiative (OSF-LGI) are two international NGOs that trained
national and local NGOs. Initially, they selected PATTIRO (Centre for Regional
Information and Studies) as a partner at the national level for this project.
PATTIRO then selected two local partners, the Bojonegoro Institute (BI) in
Bojonegoro. RWI and LGI argue that the aim of training is to improve the
capabilities of local NGO's to develop tools that enable people to demand for
accountability. In addition, they also trained the local governments in order to
improve the competencies of civil servants to manage revenue from natural
resources. Promoting accountability mechanism and planning medium term
development framework were two additional focuses of the trainings (Prijosusilo,
2012).
The last factor is the likelihood that their actions will have an influence on
government. In this case, both Joko Purwanto and Nanang Fakhrudin (a local
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journalist) argue that local NGOs' actions have an impact on the government. It is
based on the facts that several projects and training, which were initiated by local
NGOs, have been accepted and implemented by the local government (Interview
Purwanto and Fakhrudin, 2014). This is in line with opinion from the current
regent, who believes that NGOs have massive contribution in Bojonegoro. Hence,
he argues that NGOs will always be partner of local governments (Interview with
Suyoto, 2014).
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7 National level
While local governments in Indonesia have more power to regulate their regions
compared 20 years ago, political dynamics at the national level still affects the
local level. As argued by Hadiz that after the fall of Suharto, the local political
dynamics still reflect those at the national level. In this chapter, it will be
explained two dynamics at the national level that have driven the regent to
promote accountability in Bojonegoro.
7. 1. Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
The first political dynamics at the national level is the increasing effort to
combat corruption in Indonesia. Corruption is widely known as a major problem
in Indonesia. Based on the annual survey from Transparency International,
entitled Corruption Perception Index, Indonesia is still ranked as one of the most
corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2013). Over the last
ten years, however, there has been steady improvement in the reduction of
corruption. This can be seen from two surveys namely Indonesia’s corruption
perception score that has slowly climbed from 2.0 to 2.8 in 2009 (out of a scale
from 0 to 10; Transparency International, 2013) and the Word Bank Institute’s
“corruption control” indicator which has improved from _0.91 to _0.71 (out of a
scale from _2.5 to +2.5 with 0 being the worldwide average) over the same period
(World Bank Institute, 2011).
The establishment of Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) in 2003 is recognised as one factor that plays
important part in improving Indonesia’s corruption perception score (Schütte,
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2012).  KPK was formed on December 29, 2003, on the basis of Law. 30/2002 on
the Commission to Eradicate Criminal Acts of Corruption (Undang-Undang
Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 Tetang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi).
KPK is an adhoc institution that specializes only in anticorruption law
enforcement. Article 6 of Law No. 30/2002 mandates KPK to carry out the
following duties, authorities and obligations: “coordinate with institutions
authorized to combat acts of corruption”; “supervise institutions authorized to
combat acts of corruption”; “conduct (preliminary) investigations and prosecution
against acts of corruption”; conduct corruption prevention activities”; and
“conduct monitoring of state governance” (KPK in Choi, 2011, p 48).
Long prior to the foundation of KPK, there were several regulations and
institutions that have been introduced by the government as a part of anti-
corruption efforts. Choi (2011) notes that there were six anticorruption institutions
at the national level prior to the KPK. The State Apparatus Reformation
Committee (Paran), Operasi Budhi on the basis of Presidential Decree No.
275/1963, TPK (Tim Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Team) in
1968, the Committee Four (Komite Empat) in 1970, the Clean Operation (Opstib)
in 1977, and the Anti-Corruption Joint Team (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan
Tindak Pidana Korupsi-TGPTPK) in 2000 during President Abdurrahman
Wahid’s term, were established to combat corruption. Nevertheless, all of these
institutions were short-lived and ineffective due to political resistances.
Opposition of political elites who themselves were not directly and indirectly free
from corruption is another reason why these institutions failed to make substantial
changes in Indonesia’s corrupt polity (Choi, 2011).
Although in quantitative indicator, the number of cases indicted by the KPK
is lower compared to the case load of the police and the Attorney General’s Ofﬁce
(AGO or Kejaksaan Agung), the public has been more satisfied with the KPK’s
performance because the number of actual guilty verdicts that resulted from the
indictments made by the AGO and the KPK (Schütte, 2012; p 44). Indonesia
Corruption Watch (ICW) noted that over the period 2005 until 2009, only 51% of
total defendant indicted by AGO were found guilty while in contrast, 100% of the
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defendants indicted by KPK have been found guilty by the Anti-corruption Court
(Schütte, 2012; p 44).
In addition, since its establishment, KPK has been able to imprison many
high-level officials among them are: Aulia Pohan, father in law of President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's son who was sentenced to four and a half years in
jail for corruption in 2009 (Jakarta Post, 2009), Anas Urbaningrum, who was a
chief of ruling party, was named a graft suspect for allegedly taking a bribe in
relation with the construction of the Hambalang sports complex (Jakarta Post,
2013), and Ratu Atut, Banten Governor, who is widely known to have built one of
the most powerful local political dynasties in Indonesia (Jakarta Globe, 2013).
In addition, KPK aslo conducts several preventive actions at the local level.
Dedi Hartono from Research and Development Department at KPK argues that
KPK has three main strategies to prevent corruption at the local level namely
improving good governance, transparency, and Fraud Control Plan (FCP).
Moreover, KPK also collaborates with other national and local agencies to
increase integrity of civil servants at the local level.
The KPK's performance has resulted in two aspects. Firstly, KPK has gained
public trust from citizens because of its performances in imprisoning many high-
level officials. It can be seen from surveys conducted by national newspapers and
independent research organizations. A survey conducted by national KOMPAS
about local opinion on the performance of Indonesian law enforcement agencies
reveals that that 57% of the respondents were satisfied with KPK’s performance,
as compared with only 19% with the Attorney General’s Office and 22% with the
National Police (Kompas in Schütte, 2012). In October 2010, Indonesian survey
institute LSI (Lembaga Survei Indonesia) suggested a similar message when they
studied about integrity of law enforcement agencies. On a scale from (- 100) to (+
100), respondents rated only the KPK on the positive spectrum of the scale; the
police, the Attorney General’sOfﬁce (AGO), and the judiciary were found lacking
integrity (LSI in Schütte, 2012). However, not only do KPK's performances
shapes public satisfaction but also revokes the perception of impunity towards
white collar crime in Indonesia (Schütte, 2012).
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Secondly, KPK's ability to imprison many high-level officials has created
deterrent effect. Despite the problem of consistency of the courts in Indonesia in
determining the probability and the intensity of punishments across different
groups of offenders as reported by Pradiptyo (2012), several scholars still argue
that KPK's aggressive works have been able to create a deterrent effect for
politicians (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010). Since its establishment, KPK has put
deterrent effect as one of major approach in combating corruption in Indonesia.
This approach was inspired from the success of corruption eradication in Hong
Kong by The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) which focused
on legal action to create deterrent effect, preventive measures, and education
(Husodo, 2008). Several respondents in Bojonegoro admit that KPK's activities
have affected behaviour of local civil servants. There is a fear among the civil
servants that they will be arrested by KPK if they do something wrong (Interviews
with Purwanto, Fakhrudi, and Yudi, 2014). These two aspects have sent a massive
message at the local level about the rule of law at the national level thus it
constraints the politicians at local level to engage in rent-seeking activities and
also shapes incentives for politicians to promote accountability.
7. 2. Political Promotion: The Recognition of Local
Champions
The second national dynamics that drive accountability at the local levels is
the recognition of local champions at the national levels. However, this
recognition is something new in Indonesia because, over the years, the local elites
failed to penetrate and compete at the national level. The supply and demand side
problem explain why local champions failed to compete at the national level.
On the supply side, decentralization, which was initially considered as the
way to supply new competent local leaders, failed to deliver its promise.
According to Hadiz (2011, p 597), democratization in Indonesia has benefitted
those who occupied the middle and lower rungs of the New Order’s vast system
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of patronage – including its local apparatchik and operators, and its henchmen and
enforcers. Hence, local politics have been an area of political competition between
small- and medium-scale businessmen who had always relied on political
connections, middle-level civil servants who are no longer content with mere
administrative power, and seek to wield direct political power by contesting local
elections, gangsters that assisted the New Order’s feared security apparatus in the
task of intimidating opponents and maintaining order, professional politicians
with links to the old New Order parties, and  activists who had latched on to the
mass and youth organizations from which the New Order regularly recruited new
apparatchik and political operators (Hadiz, 2011, p 597-598). In addition,
Mietzner argues that at the grass-roots level, political parties frequently did not
have adequate, i.e. well-to-do, popular candidates. Hence, the local elections
became an arena for well-connected bureaucrats and wealthy businessmen who
both profited from candidacies auctioned off by weakened parties (Mietzner, 2007
in Ufen, 2006; p 27).
While on the demand side, the oligarchy's nature of political party is pointed
out as the problem that disables such penetration. Parties with strong and
charismatic leaders, in particular, often neglect the party organization including
party (Dirk Tomsa, 2008). According to Anders Ufen (2006), party organisation
was as centralised as the whole polity and intra-party decision-making as opaque
and undemocratic as the authoritarian system in general. In most parties today,
crucial decisions such as the nomination of candidates are made by some core
executive members who are usually loyal to one charismatic leader (Haris 2005:
9). The decision-making process is almost fully orientated from the top down to
the branches. Almost all parties have their power centre in Jakarta and chastise
recalcitrant members. Several examples are Megawati still has the right to decide
on vital matters without consulting the executive council (hak prerogatif) in the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). By the same token, the
Advisory Board (Dewan Syuro) in the PKB, who stands above the executive
council (Dewan Tanfidz) in many respects. Even the candidates for the Dewan
Tanfidz have to get the acknowledgement of the Dewan Syuro beforehand
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(Notosusanto 2005). In 2005, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected chief patron of the
Dewan Syuro by acclamation and not in accordance with party regulations and his
nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar, was elected new party chairman– again by
acclamation and without contender (Ufen, 2009, p 163).
However, in the last five years, the recognition of local champions has
slowly risen. Several local leaders who have been able to deliver good service and
promote accountability at the local level were promoted to the national level. The
latest example is Joko Widodo, who is nominated by his party, the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) to run in the 2014 presidential election.
Considering the fact that this party is widely known for its oligarchic structure in
which all decisions are centralized on the hand of Megawati (the daughter of
Indonesia's first president, Sukarno), Joko Widodo's nomination has been
regarded as a major breakthrough for the recognition of local champions. Joko
Widodo gained massive public attention when he was mayor of Solo in Central
Java province and widely reckoned to be Indonesia’s best mayor (The Economist,
2012). In 2012, he won the governor of Jakarta election and defeated the
incumbent governor Fauzi Bowo. Due to his performance during his term as a
governor of Jakarta, he gained public trust from citizens and placed him as the
most popular politician in Indonesia. Most opinion polls put support for the 52-
year-old Jokowi at about 40%, twice that of his closest rival, Prabowo Subianto, a
former special-forces commander, who is now patron of the Greater Indonesia
Movement Party (Gerindra) to succeed Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is
coming to the end of his second and final term as president. (The Economist,
2014). While the result of the 2014 presidential election is still mystery since this
thesis was written before the election, this phenomenon has sent a strong message
that local champions can be promoted to national level and they can compete in
political arena at the national level.
The phenomenon of local champions is very important in connection with
the rise of accountability in local government. It is important since political
promotion is an important factor in shaping politicians incentives. Theoretically, a
decent political promotion can drive cadres in the political party to perform so
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they could be promoted to a higher position. This theory assumes that politicians
are a rational actors whose behaviours are driven and constrained by the rewards
and punishments applied in their organization (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya
2007).
However, it is high of importance to analyze in more detail at the individual
context of the current regent although there is a rise of local champions in current
political dynamics in Indonesia. The most important issue that has to be addressed
in this case is the promotion system at the party that nominates him to run in
previous regent election in Bojonegoro. The current regent, Suyoto, is a cadre of
National Mandate Party which was established by several academicians just after
Suharto was removed from the office in 1998. While many parties do not clearly
regulate promotion and nomination (Notosusanto, 2005), National Mandate Party
stated on their documents that there are rewards such as promotion for politicians
(see Appendixes for more details). Based on interview on the chief party at the
provincial level, he said that performance of a cadre is one of important aspects in
political nomination and promotion. Thus, based on interviews and their
documents, National Mandate Party implements the promotion system at their
party. In addition, as I informed by several local respondents in Bojonegoro that
the current regent has a career aspiration to be a minister, so it can be argued that
he has to perform and promote accountability during his term as a regent in
Bojonegoro in order to increase possibility to be chosen as a minister in the future.
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8 Concluding Remarks
8. 1. Final Reflection
This thesis aims to explain why accountability emerges in the resource-rich region
of Bojonegoro, Indonesia. This is a case-centric study in which process-tracing
method is employed. Consequently, it is required to develop the existing
mechanism to explain the outcome. Using NPEP as the theoretical framework
implies that politicians are the important actors since the decision to promote
accountability lies in their hand. In addition, incentives faced by politicians are
regarded as the important factors that drive politicians to promote accountability.
Based on this theoretical framework, the analysis consists of two level of analysis
namely local level analysis and national level. Electoral system and collective
actions are two factors within local level analysis while rule of law and political
promotion are two factors at the national level. Since, I use deductive path, it is
important to develop an existing mechanism and test the mechanism to see
whether it can account for the outcome
After establishing this theoretical framework, the study started by gathering
data. Data were gathered through the documentary reviews and interviews. All
interviews were conducted when I did fieldwork in Jakarta and Bojonegoro,
Indonesia from 7th April until 27 April 2014.
One strategy to develop sufficient explanation is eclectic theorization which
refers to the combination of different mechanisms in a complex composite to craft
a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome. This is done by
combining four variables:  electoral system, collective actions, rule of law and
political promotion into one grand model analysis to explain why accountability
emerges in Bojonegoro. Based on empirical evidence collected during the study, I
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can positively answer the research question that accountability emerges in
Bojonegoro because of electoral system, collective actions, rule of law and
political promotion, which all drive politicians to promote accountability.
Blatter and Haverland (2008) argues that the variables might have been able
to provide strong explanation that this factors were necessary for producing the
outcome in a specific case but this might be that this factor is not necessary in
another case. In this case, all variables that are found to affect incentives faced by
politicians to promote accountability in Bojonegoro work in the context. Figure 8.
1. reveals this mechanism. The figure shows the causal mechanism, which are
very local context, that shape the independent variables. Electoral system and
collective action are two variables that fit to explain this situation.
The first example is electoral system. It is important to analyze in details
why the election system in Bojonegoro is able to shape incentives to promote
accountability. In this case, political competition and level of money politics
might have been important factors that make the nature of election in Bojonegoro
is different compared to other regency although both regencies use the same
election system.
The second example can be seen from the collective action. Hadiz (2004)
argues that the problem of collective action in Indonesia is not because of the
absence of civil society. Civil society does exist but it practices predatory
activities including political gangsters. So what makes collective action in
Bojonegoro works in a different manner. Importance of the issue at stake, their
internal divisions and conflicts of interest, their lobbying capacity and the
likelihood that their actions will have an influence on government might be four
factors that strengthen collective action in Bojonegoro to promote accountability.
The uniqueness of collective action and electoral system that have been
discussed before can be used to assess the causal power of independent variables.
While this study focuses on explaining the outcome, assessing the causal power of
independent variables is still important since this assessment allows policymakers
to manipulate the variables to ensure the same outcome in the future focus
(George and Barnett, 2005; p 219).  In this case, the Bayesian logic can be used to
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assess the causal power. According to George and Barnett (Ibid), the more unique
and unexpected the new evidence equals the greater its corroborative power.
As I stated on the methodology chapter, this study only makes a sufficient
explanation for particularly puzzling outcomes. Factors that found to affect the
outcome are extremely context specific. The complexity of social world makes the
ambition of producing knowledge that can be generalized across many cases
difficult (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Consequently, the result of this study could
not be accounted for other cases. This is the limitation of this study. In the future,
future research fill can remedy this limitation by focusing on the quantitative
study to measure the correlation between the independent variables, which are
found important in the case of Bojonegoro, with good governance indicators in
resource-rich regions using LargeN data. It also remedies the limitation of this
study that can only make tentative conclusion on how much particular variable
contribute to the outcome in a particular case.
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Figure 8.1. Final Causal Mechanism
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8. 2. Executive Summary
It is widely acknowledged that natural resource-abundance tends to be associated
with lower economic growth. This argument is known as the resources curse
hypothesis. Several studies have been able to confirm this hypothesis.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis does not apply to one regency in Indonesia:
Bojonegoro. Instead of being a predatory state, this district has been able to
achieve a high-level of economic growth over the last eight years (annual GDP
growth was 9.96%) and its annual GDP growth is higher than the national GDP
growth. In addition, the local government in Bojonegoro is also able to promote
accountability. However, accountability in Bojonegoro did not exist until 2008.
Before 2008, the regency was considered as one of the worst regencies in
Indonesia. Taking this fact into account, it is important to investigate why
accountability emerges in Bojonegoro after 2008. Consequently, this thesis seeks
to address the main question: "Why did accountability emerge in Bojonegoro after
2008?"
A New Political Economy Perspective (NPEP) is employed as the main
theoretical framework. NPEP argues that the explanation of why some
governments practice good governance such as accountability and transparency is
attributed to the incentives and interests faced by politicians. Therefore, by using
NPEP as the theoretical framework, I investigate the incentives that influence the
decisions of local elites to promote accountability in Bojonegoro.
Process-tracing method is employed in order to answer this research
question. This method requires the author to investigate multiple interaction of
variable that cause a specific outcome. Therefore, a two-level framework is
developed as the theoretical framework. This framework consists of the local level
and national level analysis. The local level and national level analysis are
preferred because the unit of analysis in this thesis is a sub-national level so it
requires the authors to investigate the local context and institutions that shape
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local politicians to promote accountability. Furthermore, it is also high of
importance to investigate the dynamics at the national level since any changes at
the national level will affect the local level. Several theories are incorporated so it
allows the author to look the possibility of equifinality.
Based on data gathered from interviews and documentary review, it can be
argued that variables in both local level and national level shape incentives to
promote accountability in Bojonegoro. The first variable within the local level is
electoral system. The hypothesis of this variable is that elected governments are
responsive and accountable to public demand since the public can give rewards
and punishment to the politicians through the elections. After conducting
documents reviews, I found that there was a change in electoral system since
2004. This new electoral system enable citizens to give rewards and punishments
for the politicians. The 2007 local election was the moment when the people
punished the unperformed regent, HM Santoso. Suyoto, the current regent, won
the election and defeat the incumbent. Suyoto admitted that the fact that he was
chosen directly by citizens drive him to promote accountability. In addition, the
level of political competition and money politics also contribute in shaping
incentives to promote accountability. The second variable within the local level is
participatory theories or collective action. It argues that citizens' ability to
articulate demands and pressure government will drive more accountable
government. In this case, it can be argued that citizens in Bojonegoro are able to
organize themselves to call for accountability from their governments. Several
initiatives such as Friday Dialogue was initiated between local NGOs and the
local government. This forum becomes an important institutions that promote
accountability in Bojonegoro. In addition, the strength of collective action in
Bojonegoro also contributes to shape incentives to promote accountability.
At the national level, the author identified two dynamics that shape local
incentives to promote accountability in Bojonegoro. The establishment of
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is the first political dynamics at the
national level. In the last seven years, KPK has successfully prosecuted and
imprisoned many high-level officials. It is thus regarded as the symbol of rule of
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law that shape local politicians' incentives to promote accountability. The second
dynamics is the recognition of local champions. Local leaders (mayors and
regents) who have been able to deliver good service at the local level were
promoted to the national level. This phenomenon is very important in connection
with the rise of accountability in local government since it serves political
promotion that shape politicians incentives to promote accountability at the local
levels.
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Appendix 1: National Mandate Party's
Statute
Article  7
Awards and Sanctions
(1) Party may give an award to the cadres, members and sympathizers of the
achievements, services, and actions which support the struggle of the party
and (or) outstanding meritorious to the state and nation of Indonesia
Article 8
Principle, Form and Mechanisms for Awards
(1) This award is made through an open, honest and fair process.
(2) Awards can be a prize, promotion and placement of cadres in positions of
political and other forms decided by the party.
(3) This award is initiated from assessment through several stages of
selection, since the making of the award guidelines to the selection
mechanism as follows:
(a) The assessment criteria set out guidelines for the selection, assessment
and determination of the stage of acceptance of the award.
(b) Determination stage of the selection of participants are taken through
listing award recipients.
(c) Administrative selection is done by the nomination team  in order to
obtain candidates of eligible participants nomination selection process.
(d) Surveys are conducted to see and identify strategic factors that affect
valuation.
(e) Assessment stage is a process when candidates that have been
surveyed is assessed to get nomination and then selected the award
recipients.
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(f) Meeting is used to determine the selection of the award recipients
based on participants nominated candidate. Meetings conducted with
the involvement of party leaders and experts who have expertise.
(g) Decision of the award is made in the appraisal meeting based on the
input of experts who have been invited.
(h) The award stipulated in the party's decision.
